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“PRACTICE READY GRADUATES”:  
A MILLENNIALIST FANTASY 
Robert J. Condlin∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The sky is falling on legal education, say the pundits,1 and 
preparing “practice ready” graduates is one of the best strategies for 
surviving the fallout.2  This is not a new prediction or a new recom-
 
∗ Professor of Law, University of Maryland Carey School of Law.  My grateful appreciation 
to Andrew Blair-Stanek, Maxwell Chibundu, Chris Condlin, Steve Ellmann, Don Gifford, 
James Grimmelmann, Michelle Harner, Alan Hornstein, Renee Hutchins, Susan Krinsky, 
Sue McCarty, Leslie Meltzer Henry, Frank Pasquale, Garrett Power, Bill Reynolds, Rohith 
Srinivas, Max Stearns, Charlie Sullivan, Greg Young, and participants in a University of 
Maryland Carey School of Law faculty workshop, all of whom made very helpful sugges-
tions. 
1 These pundits congregate at the so-called “scamblogs” (i.e., law school is a scam), 
which have popped up online over the last few years.  For a representative collection, see 
David Lat et al., Scamblogs, ABOVE THE LAW, http://abovethelaw.com/tag/scamblogs/ (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2014).  One might think of them as a law school version of “Doomsday Prep-
pers” (perhaps Doomsday Preppies would be more accurate), preparing for the coming Ar-
mageddon in their own small part of the world.  Not everyone is a Chicken Little, of course, 
some see the present turmoil as leading to a better world.  See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, A 
Glass Half Full Look at the Changes in the American Legal Market, 38 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 29, 29 (2014) (“The American legal profession finds itself in the midst of dizzying 
changes . . . [that] [t]he main commentators . . . have largely presented . . . as disastrous.  
This [e]ssay argues that . . . [the changes] will prove beneficial overall.”); id. at 30-31 (de-
scribing the benefits to society, law students, and law schools of the coming changes). 
2 See, e.g., Symposium, The Way to Carnegie: Practice, Practice—Pedagogy, Social Jus-
tice, and Cost in Experiential Legal Education, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 215, 221 (2012) 
(symposium on the effectiveness of clinical education for preparing lawyers to be “practice 
ready”); William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461, 462 (2013) 
(“Creating more ‘practice ready’ graduates will help some law schools more effectively 
place their graduates in the finite—and likely shrinking—market for traditional entry level 
legal jobs.  Yet, this strategy cannot work for all schools.”); News Release, New York State 
Bar Ass’n, New York State Bar Resolution Calls for “Practice Ready Lawyers,” (Aug. 9, 
2011), http://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=6383 (“Law schools and 
other legal education providers should be encouraged to develop ‘practice ready lawyers . . . 
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mendation for survival.  It is a millennialist3 version of the argument 
for clinical legal education that dominated discussion in the law 
schools in the 1960s and 1970s.4  The circumstances are different 
now, of course, as are the people calling for reform.  For many, doing 
well has replaced doing good as the principal goal, and private, fee-
for-service practitioners have replaced neighborhood legal services 
lawyers as the principal people leading the charge.  But the two 
movements are alike in one fundamental respect: both view skills in-
struction5 as legal education’s primary purpose.  Everything else is a 
 
.’ ”).  Professor Henderson is skeptical that the “practice ready” strategy is enough to cope 
with the present troubles.  Henderson, supra, at 501 (“ ‘Practice-Ready’ is Not Enough.  De-
spite the rebukes often received from the practicing bar, for most law schools an emphasis on 
“practice-ready” skills will be insufficient to cope with the structural changes occurring 
within the legal industry.”) (emphasis added). 
3 It is common today to identify millennialism with a date (e.g., the year 2000), a length of 
time (a thousand years), or a generation (those born in the 1980s), but in scholarly discourse 
the term refers to a system of thought based on the “belief that at some point in the future the 
world that we live in will be radically transformed into one of perfection—of peace, justice, 
fellowship and plenty.”  See RICHARD LANDES, HEAVEN ON EARTH: THE VARIETIES OF THE 
MILLENNIAL EXPERIENCE 20 (2011) (emphasis in original).  The key tropes in millennialist 
thinking, whether secular or religious, are “apocalyptic scenarios filled with . . . outrageous 
hopes and fears and paranoid conspiracy thinking.”  Id. at xii.  Blog commentary on the de-
mise of legal education has all of these tropes. 
4 Debates about the law school curriculum go back to the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries and the iconic figures of Christopher Columbus Langdell, Josef Redlich, and 
Alfred Reed.  See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 
1850S TO THE 1980S, at 51-64, 112-23 (1983).  Practice instruction entered the picture in the 
1930s, see, e.g., John S. Bradway, Some Distinctive Features of a Legal Aid Clinic Course, 1 
U. CHI. L. REV. 469 (1934); Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. 
REV. 907 (1933); George K. Gardner, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer School?— Some Reflec-
tions, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 785 (1934); Karl N. Llewellyn, On What is Wrong with So-Called 
Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 651 (1935), and hit its high water mark in the “clinical 
education” movement of the 1960s and 1970s, when a coalition of former neighborhood le-
gal services lawyers, segments of the Bar, and the Ford Foundation (through the Council on 
Legal Education for Professional Responsibility), urged law schools to become more “rele-
vant” by making “skills training” rather than “thinking like a lawyer,” their central objective.  
See Robert J. Condlin, The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education, in THE GOOD 
LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 317, 332-36 (David Luban ed., 1985) 
(describing the origins of clinical legal education); John M. Lande, Reforming Legal Educa-
tion to Prepare Law Students Optimally for Real-World Practice, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 4 
(2013) (describing “a history of more than a century of criticism and recommendations for 
reform” of legal education).  Clinical education had non-skill dimensions as well, see infra 
note 99, but they gradually diminished in importance as clinical programs tried to appeal to a 
broader market.  That private practitioners lawyers would wage a similar campaign fifty 
years later would have astonished those early clinicians.  I know, I was one of them. 
5 Once synonyms, “skills instruction” and “clinical education” now have slightly different 
meanings.  Skills courses teach about lawyer interpersonal practice tasks (e.g., interviewing, 
counseling, and negotiation), usually using hypothetical, self-contained, and substantively 
2
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frolic and detour, and a fatal frolic and detour in hard times such as 
the present.6 
Most would agree that the United States legal system has both 
a labor market and a student debt problem.7  The legal labor market 
was overbuilt and has retrenched.8  It also is shrinking in the face of 
increased competition from non-law firm service providers,9 changes 
in technology,10 and downward pressure on fees from clients.11  As a 
 
disembodied exercises, problems, and drills.  Clinical courses also teach about interpersonal 
practice tasks, but in the context of actual client representation where, of necessity, they also 
teach about substantive law, professional values, interpersonal relationships, institutional and 
organizational arrangements, and the like.  Substantive law and practice skills are interrelat-
ed, of course, since skills operate famously in the “shadow of the law.”  Robert H. Mnookin 
& Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE 
L.J. 950 (1979). 
6 Arguments of this sort proliferate during difficult economic times and diminish during 
prosperous ones.  Karl Llewellyn’s Depression era change in views about the importance of 
practice instruction is a good example.  See Anders Walker, Bramble Bush Revisited: Karl 
Llewellyn, the Great Depression, and the First Law School Crisis, 1929-1939, J. LEGAL 
EDUC. (forthcoming 2014), draft at 20-26, available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2325022 (during the Depression “Llewellyn blasted legal education for 
failing ‘to equip’ students ‘for the practice of law,’ ” suggesting that it needed to provide 
“sounder technical training,” only to revert to his original interdisciplinary, academic per-
spective when prosperity returned). 
7 See AM. BAR ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION: WORKING 
PAPER 1 (Aug. 1, 2013) (The “complex system of tuition, discounting, and loans” used to 
fund legal education “drive[s] up [both] tuition and debt . . . [and is] in need of serious re-
engineering.”). 
8 Bernard A. Burk, What’s New about the New Normal: The Evolving Market for New 
Lawyers in the 21st Century, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 541, 541 (2014) (“[T]he market for new 
lawyers overall, will remain depressed below pre-recession levels well after demand recov-
ers . . . .”); Chris Johnson, The Am Law 200’s Haves and Have-Nots, AM. LAW. (June 10, 
2013), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202600856100 (describing how $2.4 billion 
was wiped from the Am Law 200’s collective top lines in 2009—the first fall in overall rev-
enue since the American Lawyer started tracking law firm financials more than two decades 
ago). 
9 See Barton, supra note 1, at 32-34 (describing the role of “disruptive technologies” in 
increasing the pressure from “above, below and the side” on the market for legal services, 
using LegalZoom as an example), and at 35 (changing market conditions will have the same 
effect on small firm lawyers that “Turbotax has had on the accounting profession.”) (empha-
sis added).  But see Robin Sparkman, Don’t Bury Big Law Just Yet, AMLAW DAILY (July 24, 
2013), http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleALD.jsp?id=1202612266779&Dont_ 
Bury_Big_ Law_Just_Yet (“The [hundred] biggest law firms, ranked by their gross revenue, 
continued to post revenue and profit gains even as the U.S. economy sputtered.”). 
10 See James G. Leipold, The New Entry-Level Legal Employment Market, BAR 
EXAMINER, June 2013, at 7, available at http://www.ncbex.org/assets/media_files/Bar-
Examiner/articles/2013/820213Leipold.pdf (describing “the impact of technology” on the 
legal industry). 
11 Press Release, Association of Corporate Counsel, More Corporate Law Departments 
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consequence, there are fewer jobs for law graduates to fill, and fewer 
law graduates with jobs mean fewer graduates able to repay their stu-
dent loans.12  These conditions are beginning to have an effect on the 
size and cost of legal education and probably will continue to do so 
into the foreseeable future.13  But it does not follow that they should 
have a corresponding effect on the structure and content of that edu-
cation as well. 
Law schools cannot revive the labor market, or improve the 
employment prospects of their graduates, by providing a different 
type of education.  Placing students in jobs is principally a function 
of a school’s academic reputation, not its curriculum,14 and the legal 
 
Turn to Legal Support Services to Reduce Excessive Fees (June 19, 2013), http://www. 
acc.com/aboutacc/newsroom/pressreleases/acc-value-champions-2013.cfm (“General coun-
sel are restructuring the balance of projects they outsource versus those they maintain in-
house, pursuing long-term partnerships with choice law firms and looking at new ways to 
share costs in multi-party litigation . . . .”).  See also Leipold, supra note 10, at 11 
(“[C]hange is the result of . . . downward pressure on rates by corporate clients.”). 
12 At the present time law student default rates on student loans are lower than the default 
rates of students in all other forms of postsecondary education and have been for twenty 
years.  See Michael Simkovic, Repetitive (and avoidable) mistakes, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW 
SCH. REPORTS (July 28, 2013, 8:53 AM), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/07/ 
repetitive-and-avoidable-mistakes.html (describing student loan default rates).  That may 
change.  See also Ronit Dinovitzer, Bryant G. Garth, & Joyce S. Sterling, Buyers’ Remorse? 
An Empirical Assessment of the Desirability of a Lawyer Career, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211 
(2013) (reporting on the first two waves of data from the American Bar Foundation after the 
J.D. project, describing the effect of law school debt on job choice and career satisfaction). 
13 See Barton, supra note 1, at 35 (describing the consequences for law schools of the re-
cent crash in legal markets); Ashby Jones & Jennifer Smith, Amid Falling Enrollment, Law 
Schools Are Cutting Faculty, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424127887323664204578607810292433272.html (describing how law schools 
with a dwindling applicant pool are accepting fewer students and making up for lost tuition 
dollars by “offering buyouts and early-retirement packages to senior, tenured professors and 
canceling contracts with lower-level instructors”); Dan Filler, University of Iowa Approves 
Steep Law Tuition Cut, THE FACULTY LOUNGE (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.thefaculty 
lounge.org/2013/12/university-of-iowa-approves-steep-law-tuition-cut.html (describing how 
some law schools are reducing tuition “to bring the 1L class size back up”). 
14 Firms will assume, as they should, that the most highly regarded schools will have the 
ablest students and that the ablest students will be the quickest studies.  There will be indi-
vidual exceptions to these rules of thumb, of course, and better training can narrow the dif-
ferences among schools to some extent, but smart money bets on talent and probabilities, not 
training, anomalies, or vignettes.  Not everyone agrees.  See Neil J. Dilloff, Law School 
Training: Bridging the Gap between Legal Education and the Practice of Law, 24 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 425, 427-28 (2013) (“[T]hose law schools that are able to turn out ‘finished’ 
work-ready graduates will move to the head of the pack, and their graduates will have a leg-
up in this uncertain job market.”); Neil Hamilton, Law-Firm Competency Models and Stu-
dent Professional Success: Building on a Foundation of Professional For-
mation/Professionalism 3 (Univ. of St. Thomas School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
4
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labor market will rebound only after the market as a whole has re-
bounded (and perhaps not then).  Law school curricular reform is not 
an economic stimulant and trying to use it for that purpose will de-
stroy something that works in a futile attempt to revive something 
that does not.  Legal education’s principal purposes should be (and 
always have been) to develop an intellectual understanding of law 
and legal institutions and the way they work, as well as the critical 
thinking skills that underlie law practice tasks generally.  Becoming 
proficient at practice tasks is the work of work, so to speak, the result 
of performing the tasks over and over again, on a daily basis, under 
the guidance of mentors, as part of the process of being socialized in-
to the profession.  Legal education, like most higher education, helps 
one avoid becoming a captive of socialization more than it socializ-
es,15 and to adapt received wisdom to changing beliefs and circum-
stances more than internalize wisdom in its present form. 
The labor market and student debt problems have been dis-
cussed extensively at both the breezy and sophisticated levels and I 
 
No. 13-22, Dec. 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2271410 (“A law stu-
dent who understands legal employer competency models can differentiate him or herself 
from other graduates by . . . [developing] specific competencies beyond just knowledge of 
doctrinal law, legal analysis, and some written and oral communication skills.”).  Compara-
tive advantage arguments of this sort have the self-cancelling quality characteristic of many 
well-known bargaining nostrums (e.g., “never make the first offer”).  See Robert J. Condlin, 
Bargaining Without Law, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 281, 310 n.83 (2011-2012).  If everyone 
followed them they would not work.  For example, if preparing practice-ready graduates 
gives a law school a comparative advantage in the employment market eventually every law 
school will adopt the strategy, and that will destroy its advantage.  The strategy works, in 
other words, only if a few schools use it; but every school will use it if it works.  See Hen-
derson, supra note 2, at 242 (“Creating more ‘practice ready’ graduates will help some law 
schools more effectively place their graduates in the finite—and likely shrinking—market 
for traditional entry level legal jobs.  Yet, this strategy cannot work for all schools.”).  There 
also is considerable empirical evidence that the strategy does not work.  See infra note 30. 
15 It helps one avoid becoming another President Robbins.  See RANDALL JARRELL, 
PICTURES FROM AN INSTITUTION 11 (2010) (“President Robbins was so well adjusted to his 
environment that sometimes you could not tell which was the environment and which was 
President Robbins.”).  Not everyone thinks this is a bad thing.  See Dilloff, supra note 14, at 
438 (describing the importance of being a “can do” instead of “can’t do” lawyer in respond-
ing to client requests), and at 441 (describing the importance of being “virtually integrated 
into the client’s business”).  Professor Hamilton describes becoming one with the client as a 
“client-identified competency” that law schools and students should develop to differentiate 
themselves from other schools and other students.  See Hamilton, supra note 14, at 19.  The 
“practice-ready” graduates proposal has some of the same properties as this client-
identification view, in the sense that it asks law schools to treat law firms as clients and iden-
tify completely with firm needs. 
5
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will not revisit those discussions here.16  Instead, I will focus on the 
popular “practice ready” graduates proposal and explain why it is a 
bad idea.17  The proposal has been accepted uncritically in many 
quarters and this is surprising, since it is largely unintelligible in its 
own right, and even if intelligible, irrelevant to the present troubles.  
There are as many different types of practice, for example, as there 
are levels of readiness for it, and proponents of the proposal do not 
explain which of these various possibilities (and combinations of 
possibilities), they have in mind.  If the “practice ready” concept had 
a single meaning, on the other hand, schools still could not act on it 
since proficiency18 at practice (or any expert skill) is based on dispo-
sitions (i.e., habits informed by reflection), and dispositions take 
longer than a school semester to develop.  If by some sleight of hand, 
or divine intervention, these obstacles could be overcome, still noth-
ing would change, since the cause of the present troubles is a lack of 
jobs, not a lack of graduates, and producing more graduates (of any 
kind) will have no effect on the supply of jobs.19  Like a lot of blog 
commentary, the “practice ready” proposal is more slogan than idea.  
 
16 For a sophisticated discussion of whether law school is a good investment, see the Sim-
kovic-Tamanaha debate described in infra note 26.  For a discussion of the student debt 
problem, see Philip G. Schrag, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS—Brian Tamanaha’s Misguided Mis-
sile, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 387 (2013), and Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Problems with In-
come Based Repayment, and the Charge of Elitism: Responses to Schrag and Chambliss, 26 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521 (2013). 
17 Professors Konefsky and Sullivan reach a similar conclusion but for a slightly different 
reason.  See Alfred S. Konefsky & Barry Sullivan, Commentary: There’s More to the Law 
Than ‘Practice-Ready,’ CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 23, 2011, at A30 (“Law graduates must 
be practice-ready, not simply in the sense of being ready for the first stage of practice, but by 
being equipped for a lifetime of professional growth and service under conditions of chal-
lenge and uncertainty . . . .  [They must] pay attention to the work of anthropologists . . . 
psychologists, and sociologists . . . because their insights are useful—even indispensable—in 
understanding and solving legal problems in our complex and rapidly changing world.”). 
18 See Dilloff, supra note 14, at 430 (describing the obligation of “the nation’s law schools 
to enhance the level of legal maturity and proficiency of their graduates”). 
19 There would be no agitation for “practice ready” graduates if high-paying legal jobs 
were still plentiful, just as there was no such agitation before the 2008 recession.  The ani-
mating force behind the “practice ready” proposal is a depressed labor market, not inade-
quate legal education.  Legal education is the focus of the present discussion largely because 
it is an easy target and, as Professor Leiter explains, unemployed law graduates need to find 
“someone to blame in order to anaesthetize their pain.”  Brian Leiter, American Law Schools 
and the Psychology of Cyber-Hysteria, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 31, 2013, 11:56 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-leiter/law-schools-cyber-hysteria_b_4517107.html.  
As for bloggers, their agitation seems traceable to a disappointment with their place in the 
great chain of being.  They seem to have expected greater things.  Some also still may be 
mad about their grades. 
6
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Perhaps that is why it is so popular. 
II. THE ARGUMENT FOR PRACTICE READY GRADUATES 
Prevailing wisdom has it that legal education has drifted into 
uncharted waters, its instruments have failed, and it is in danger of 
sinking.  All of this happened quickly, as a consequence of upheavals 
in the economy at large, and came as a surprise to most in the field.  
First came the recession and the concomitant flight of wealth from 
the economy, then a decrease in economic activity that wealth had 
fueled, then a corresponding loss of law firm business that economic 
activity had supported, followed by law firm reductions in staff to 
compensate for the loss of that business, and ultimately by fewer jobs 
for newly minted law school graduates in the now downsized law 
firms.20  All the while, law schools proceeded as if it were business as 
usual, admitting the same number of students, charging the same 
prices, and turning out the same number of graduates.  It did not take 
long for supply to outstrip demand and for student debt to outstrip 
ability to pay.21 
 
20 Some see this as a good thing.  See Barton, supra note 1, at 30-31 (“America as a whole 
will be significantly better off if we spend less on legal services . . . A reallocation of human 
resources away from law will also be beneficial to society as a whole, the legal profession, 
and [law] students themselves.  Society benefits because too many bright young people have 
been going to law school, rather than potentially choosing societally more beneficial 
work.”). 
21 Many people have told this story, from different perspectives and with different empha-
ses.  A representative sample includes: STEVEN J. HARPER, THE LAWYER BUBBLE: A 
PROFESSION IN CRISIS (2013); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012); Barton, 
supra note 1; Stephen F. Diamond, The Future of the American Law School or, How the 
‘Crits’ Led Brian Tamanaha Astray and His Failing Law School Fails (Santa Clara U. Legal 
Studies Res. Paper No. 3-13, Jan. 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2207749; 
Henderson, supra note 3; Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Small Is the New Biglaw: Some Thoughts 
on Technology, Economics, and the Practice of Law, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (2009); Larry E. 
Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749.  Professors Simkovic and McIn-
tyre’s analysis of the economic value of a law degree added a level of empirical and tech-
nical sophistication to the discussion that had been missing in some of the earlier analyses.  
See Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree (HLS Pro-
gram on the Legal Profession Res. Paper No. 2013-6, Apr. 13, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250585.  For a summary of reactions to 
the Simkovic & McIntrye article and the authors’ responses, see Michael Simkovic, The 
Economic Value of a Law Degree: Week 1 Summary, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. REPORTS 
(July 21, 2013, 10:06 AM), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/07/the-economic-
value-of-law-degree-week-1-summary.html; Michael Simkovic, The Economic Value of a 
Law Degree: Correcting Misconceptions, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. REPORTS (Aug. 1, 2013, 
5:35 AM), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/08/the-economic-value-of-a-law-
7
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At first, this all seemed like a minor hiccup in an economic 
system characterized by boom and bust cycles.  But over time it be-
came clear that a market correction of historic proportions and un-
known duration was underway,22 and many bloggers started to de-
scribe the changed conditions as the “new normal.”23  Lending 
institutions continued to insist that student educational loans be paid 
on time, however, and soon some law graduates without jobs could 
not do this.24  Many of these graduates had thought of law school as 
more like a Treasury Bill than a junk bond, and had not considered 
what they would do if the investment did not work out.25  When re-
munerative work did not follow automatically from schooling, there-
fore, they began to scream.26 
 
degree-correcting-misconceptions.html. 
22 Hildebrandt Consulting LLC & Citi Private Bank, 2013 CLIENT ADVISORY 1 (2013), 
available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/CitiHildebrandt2013Client 
Advisory.pdf (“[W]e think it is time to let go of any lingering notion that the [legal] industry 
will revert to the boom years before the Great Recession anytime soon.”). 
23 This term became popular after Mohamed A. El-Erian, the CEO of Pacific Investment 
Management Company (PIMCO), used it in the 2010 Per Jacobsson lecture.  See Mohamed 
A. El-Erian, Navigating the New Normal in Industrial Countries, INT’L MONETARY FUND 
(Oct. 10, 2010), http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2010/101010.htm.  The concept 
itself is an old one, however, and not given much credence by economists.  See Catherine 
Rampell, The ‘New Normal’ is Actually Pretty Old, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Jan. 11, 
2011, 10:27 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/the-new-normal-is-
actually-pretty-old/; Alice Gomstyn, Finance: Americans Adapt to the ‘New Normal,’ ABC 
NEWS (June 15, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Economy/storynew?id=7827032& 
page=1#.UeQE42T71P8.  Legal bloggers seem to find the expression irresistible.  The most 
well-known proponents are Patrick Lamb and Paul Lippe, who named their blog on the ABA 
Journal Online after the expression.  See Welcome to ‘The New Normal,’ THE NEW NORMAL 
(Oct. 13, 2010, 10:31 CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/welcome_to_the 
_new_normal. 
24 Even some graduates with jobs could not make the loan payments.  See Leipold, supra 
note 10, at 13-15 (describing the declining salaries paid new law graduates in firms of all 
sizes, and those paid to graduates forced to take jobs outside the legal market).  But see Sim-
kovic, supra note 12 (describing how law school graduate loan default rates are lower than 
the default rates for graduates of higher education generally), and Dinovitzer, Garth & Ster-
ling, supra note 12 (describing the effect of law school debt on job choice and career satis-
faction). 
25 See Barton, supra note 1, at 31 (“[M]any of the law students from five years ago did not 
belong in law schools.  They came because it was a default choice for smart college gradu-
ates who were bad at math but still wanted a safe career with a large salary.”). 
26 See Barton, supra note 1, at 35 (“Disgruntled law graduates started the ball rolling with 
so-called ‘scam-blogs’ decrying law school as nothing more than a bait and switch hustle.”).  
The screamers may not represent a significant percentage of law school graduates generally.  
The blogosphere has become a bit of an echo chamber on topics of this sort.  Even academic 
commentators have been known to raise their voices.  Criticism of the Simkovic/McIntyre 
paper on the value of a law degree is a good example, though that debate now appears to be 
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 1, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss1/9
2014 A MILLENNIALIST FANTASY 83 
 
Legal bloggers were quick to capitalize on the situation.27  
Young lawyers read blogs out of proportion to the profession at large, 
and stories about student educational debt guaranteed large and en-
thusiastic audiences.  Early discussions described the problem—the 
cost of law school, the size of the collective debt, the unavailability of 
traditional mechanisms for dealing with it (e.g., bankruptcy)—more 
than they analyzed it.  When this became old hat, emphasis shifted to 
 
over.  See, e.g., Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 21.  See also Michael Simkovic, Brian 
Tamanaha Says We Should Look at the Below Average Outcomes (And We Did), 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (July 18, 2013, 9:50 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com 
/archives/2013/07/brian-tamanaha-says-we-should-look-at-the-below-average-outcomes-
and-we-did.html#sthash.EGH1GZyw.dpuf (debate between Michael Simkovic and Brian 
Tamanaha over the economic value of a law degree); Michael Simkovic, Brian Tamanaha’s 
Straw Men (Part 1): Why We Used SIPP Data from 1996 to 2011, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. 
REPORTS (July 24, 2013, 5:17 AM), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/ leiter/2013/07/brian-
tamanahas-straw-men-part-1-why-we-used-sipp-data-from-1996-to-2011.html (same); Mi-
chael Simkovic, Brian Tamanaha’s Straw Men (Part 2): Who’s Cherry Picking?, BRIAN 
LEITER’S LAW SCH. REPORTS (July 25, 2013, 9:23 AM), http://leiterlawschool.typepad. 
com/leiter/2013/07/brian-tamanahas-straw-men-part-2-more-years-of-data-are-just-as-likely-
to-increase-the-earnings-prem.html (same); Michael Simkovic, Brian Tamanaha’s Straw 
Men (Part 3): We use better (and more) data than studies Tamanaha praised in his book, 
BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. REPORTS (July 26, 2013, 9:55 AM), http://leiterlawschool. 
typepad.com/leiter/2013/07/brian-tamanahas-straw-men-part-3-we-use-better-and-more-
data-than-studies-tamanaha-praised-in-his-bo.html (same); Michael Simkovic, Brian Ta-
manaha’s Straw Men (Part 4): We would have to be off by 85 Percent for our basic conclu-
sion to be incorrect, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. REPORTS (July 29, 2013, 9:56 AM), 
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/07/brian-tamanahas-straw-men-part-4-we-
would-have-to-be-off-by-85-percent-for-our-basic-conclusion-to-b.html (same); Michael 
Simkovic, Sample Size, standard errors, and confidence intervals, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. 
REPORTS (Aug. 5, 2013, 6:29 AM), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/08 
/sample-size-standard-errors-and-confidence-intervals.html (Simkovic responding to Debo-
rah Merritt’s criticisms of the “Economic Value” paper).  See also infra note 104.  Not eve-
rything in the debate was shouting, there also were some funny parts.  See, e.g., Professor 
Diamond’s declaration of a winner, after first showing that everyone was on the same side.  
See Stephen F. Diamond, Man Bites Dog: “Bad Cop” Law Prof Paul Campos, Leader of 
Anti-Law School Camp, Backs New JD Value Study, TAXPROF BLOG (July 19, 2013), 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2013/07/what-is-the.html (business law professor 
explaining the concepts of net present value and opportunity cost to “law and literature” 
trained law professor); Stephen F. Diamond, Brian Tamanaha to the Law School World: 
“Never Mind,” TAXPROF BLOG (July 29, 2013), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/ 
2013/07/diamond-responds.html [hereinafter Diamond, Never Mind] (describing Brian Ta-
manaha’s “surrender” in the debate).  See also Brian Leiter, Reflections on “The Economic 
Value of a Law Degree,” and the Response to It, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCH. REPORTS (July 
30, 2013, 4:54 AM), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2013/07/the-economic-value-
of-a-law-degree-redux-1-1.html (summing it all up). 
27 The blog Above the Law is the most notorious of these.  It runs a version of a law school 
debt story almost every day.  For a representative sample, see Search Results for Student 
Debt, ABOVE THE LAW, http://abovethelaw.com/?s=student+debt (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
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assigning blame, and almost instantly attention focused on law 
schools.  Schools were faulted for charging too much, misleading ap-
plicants about employment prospects, not preparing students for a 
changing market, and being profligate spenders (overpaying and un-
der-working a lazy professoriate) and passing the cost on to the group 
least able to bear it (i.e., students). 
This focus on law schools was a little surprising.  Law schools 
had not caused the recession and were not major players in the econ-
omy.  This non-sequitur notwithstanding, in short order reform of le-
gal education became the principal blogging game in town, and the 
demand for “practice ready” graduates became the proposal around 
which most bloggers united.28  Graduates who are able to function 
 
28 Even the American Bar Association weighed in on the issue.  See ABA House of Dele-
gates Recommendation 10B, 2011 Annual Meeting, AM. BAR ASS'N (adopted as revised 
2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_ 
delegates/resolutions/2011_hod_annual_meeting_daily_journal_FINAL.authcheckdam.pdf 
(“RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges legal education providers to im-
plement curricular programs intended to develop practice ready lawyers including, but not 
limited to enhanced capstone and clinical courses that include client meetings and court ap-
pearances.”) (capitalization in original). 
 See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL 
EDUCATION: DRAFT REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2-3 (Sept. 20, 2013) (on file with au-
thor) (“The balance between doctrinal instruction and focused preparation for the delivery of 
legal services needs to shift still further toward developing the competencies required by 
people who will deliver legal services to clients.”).  This latest ABA paper on legal educa-
tion is a deeply flawed document.  Starting from what it describes as a “fundamental ten-
sion” between legal education’s dual status as a “public [and] private good,” id. at 6-7 (what 
the Report actually describes is the tension between education and training—it mistakenly 
thinks of those as the same thing), it proposes reconstituting law schools as technical training 
institutes “devoted specifically to preparing students to pursue and compete for jobs.”  Id. at 
13.  It makes a few, mostly adjectival, concessions to critics of its earlier working paper on 
the same subject, see supra note 7, but for the most part it retains the anti-intellectualism and 
worker bee myopia which characterized that earlier work.  It shows no awareness of the ob-
ligation to prepare lawyers to implement rules and operate institutions to serve the ends of 
justice, fairness, equality, and efficiency, for example, or the obligation to future generations 
to help construct legal norms and institutions that can adapt to changing social and political 
circumstances, needs, and beliefs.  Instead, it focuses obsessively on the present and con-
structs a blueprint for satisfying students’ immediate “customer” desires rather than theirs 
and the legal system’s long-term interests. 
 In this same spirit, it depicts legal scholarship as a drag on education, adding to its cost 
without producing any corresponding benefit, ignoring the numerous contributions of legal 
scholarship to the development of law over the years.  See, e.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis 
D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) (privacy); Boris I. Bittker, 
Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REV. 277 (1978) (tax); 
Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities, 
98 MINN. L. REV. 265 (2013) (commodities trading); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX (2d ed. 1993) (antitrust); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 
10
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competently as lawyers from day one in the office, so the argument 
went, would have a better chance of finding work than graduates who 
need extensive training to become cost effective and trustworthy.29  If 
law schools want their students to get jobs therefore, they must make 
them “practice ready” when they graduate.30  Perhaps this is correct, 
 
(1964) (property); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Ef-
fective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (environmental protection); Rob-
ert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in 
Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707 (1983) (copyright); Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any 
Rate, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007, available at http://www.democracyjournal.org/5/ 
6528.php (consumer financial protection); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) (product safety); and dozens of others.  See THE 
CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (David Kennedy & William Fisher III eds., 2006) 
(describing twenty law review articles that have had a profound effect on the shape of Amer-
ican law and legal institutions); Michelle M. Harner & Jason A. Cantone, Is Legal Scholar-
ship Out of Touch? An Empirical Analysis of the Use of Scholarship in Business Law Cases, 
19 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1 (2011) (describing the influence of legal business law scholar-
ship on the decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court).  It also ignores the systemic contribu-
tions of scholars like Henry Hart and Albert Sachs, Mitchell Polinsky, Richard Posner, and 
numerous others, who changed the ways in which generations of judges and lawyers go 
about their business and think about law and legal institutions.  Scholarship is the legal sys-
tem’s seed corn, and destroying seed corn eventually makes an ecosystem uninhabitable. 
 The Task Force’s mindset reminds me of my brief experience as a member of the Long 
Range Planning Committee of a major state bar.  Long range planning for our Committee 
consisted of someone saying: “You know, last week this happened to me; there ought to be a 
law against it,” and the Committee (with me excepting) agreeing.  See Stephen B. Burbank 
& Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 
1600 (2014) (“Smart people operating as part of a group may be perfectly willing to make 
decisions on the basis of their pooled reflections.  Particularly if they can claim expertise or 
are confident about their power, they may also be willing to recommend bold action that they 
deem normatively desirable without worrying about empirical support and without any rig-
orous attempt to assess costs and benefits.”).  Hopefully, the ABA House of Delegates will 
understand the risks in such casual empiricism and spare law schools the harm wreaked by 
similar short term thinking in the present day worlds of law practice and business.  “The cus-
tomer is always right” may have worked for Marshall Field in selling dry goods, but it is a 
prescription for disaster in legal education. 
29 See Dilloff, supra note 14, at 427-32. 
30 The available evidence suggests that this strategy does not work.  Over two decades ago 
the MACCRATE REPORT found that law firms preferred their own in-house skills training pro-
grams to those of law schools, and that they did not view participation in law school skills 
courses as an important factor in hiring.  See REPORT OF TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND 
THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, ABA LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 7 n.2 (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE].  This 
makes sense.  Firms with the resources to train new lawyers (i.e., mostly Biglaw firms) can 
design (or contract for) programs tailored closely to their types of practice and firm culture, 
and these programs will be more efficient than the less sophisticated, generic ones offered by 
law schools.  Firms also have better access than law schools to expert practitioners to teach 
such programs.  Accord Dilloff, supra note 14, at 451-53.  If anecdotal evidence is correct, 
Biglaw associates laid off during the recent recession are having a more difficult time find-
11
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but there are many reasons to doubt it. 
To begin with, it is not clear what types of “practice” propo-
nents of the concept of “practice ready” have in mind.  Biglaw prac-
tice differs from small and medium size firm work, for example, gov-
ernment work from private practice generally, in-house corporate 
work from each of these, and all of them from prosecuting and de-
fending criminal defendants, or representing clients in a neighbor-
hood legal services office for the poor.  Each setting involves work-
ing with different kinds of clients on different types of problems, 
provides access to different levels of resources and supervisory guid-
ance, and requires different types of knowledge and skills.  In some 
of these settings lawyers work principally with ideas and texts (writ-
ing memos, proofreading documents, reviewing transcripts), in others 
principally with people (interviewing clients, deposing witnesses, ne-
gotiating with lawyers, arguing to judges), and in still others princi-
pally with institutions (filing documents and searching records in 
courts, agencies, departments, registries, and the like).  People have 
known for a long time that law is not a “unitary profession.”31 
 
ing work than less “practice ready” new law graduates, and this also suggests that law firms 
like to do their own training.  Law school skills courses are valuable primarily to students 
who will work in firms where in-house training is not available.  See MACCRATE, supra, at 
30 (“[I]f the recruits for [law firms with their own training programs] are getting needed or 
highly useful training, [one must ask:] what of the much larger number of new attorneys who 
begin practice by themselves or in offices that do not provide such training?”).  Deborah 
Merritt’s recent discussion of the employment effects of Washington & Lee Law School’s 
“practice ready” curriculum, see Karen Sloan, Reality’s knocking, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 7, 2009), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202433612463&Realitys_knocking&slr
eturn=20130719130100 (subscription required) (describing the Washington & Lee curricu-
lum), confirms these conclusions.  See Deborah J. Merritt, An Employment Puzzle, LAW 
SCHOOL CAFE (table started on June 18, 2013), www.lawschoolcafe.org/thread/an-
employment-puzzle/ (“Washington & Lee pioneered an experiential third-year program that 
has won accolades from many observers . . . . Surely graduates of this widely praised pro-
gram are reaping success in the job market?  Sadly, the statistics say otherwise.  Washington 
& Lee’s recent employment outcomes are worse than those of similarly ranked schools.”). 
31 See Phoebe A. Haddon, Education for a Public Calling in the 21st Century, 69 WASH. 
L. REV. 573, 580 (1994) (“[A]n effort to define lawyering as a ‘single public profession of 
shared learning, skills and professional values’ which is focused on the past . . . is shortsight-
ed and potentially unproductive.”); Lande, supra note 4, at 1 (“[L]awyers work on many 
types of problems . . . .”); Wallace Loh, Introduction: The MacCrate Report—Heuristic or 
Prescriptive?, 69 WASH. L. REV. 505, 511 (1994) (“[T]he legal profession is in fact stratified 
and specialized in its functions, and not all lawyers are cut from the same mold.”); Ronald J. 
Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Be-
tween Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 534-49 (1994) (describing differences 
between practice “cultures,” with special focus on commercial litigation and family law 
practice); Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths 
12
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Law schools cannot prepare students for all of these types of 
work because the range of skills needed is too large.  But they also 
cannot target sub-categories of the work because students will not 
know what types of practice they will enter when they graduate.  
They may know what they would like to do, but they cannot be sure 
there will be jobs in those fields, or if there are jobs, that they will be 
competitive in the markets to fill them.  They also cannot be sure that 
their preferences in law school will remain intact once they have 
worked in a field.  Some expectations may turn out to be unwarranted 
and some assumptions false.  Should this happen, the time spent 
learning skills no longer used might appear, in retrospect, to have 
been a greater waste of time than the time now spent learning law 
they think they will not use.32 
If the concept of “practice” could be given a single meaning, 
however, there still would be the question of what it means to be 
“ready” for that practice.33  Must newly minted lawyers be able to 
 
from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157, 166 (1994) (describing differences in 
lawyer practice roles). For descriptive accounts of different types of practice, see LINCOLN 
CAPLAN, SKADDEN (1993), and DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE (1993).  Law school 
graduates who do not work in law firms will need even different types of skills. 
 The differences among types of legal work are not limited to practice skills.  Conventions 
for truth telling, candor, and fair play also vary considerably from one type and location of 
practice to another.  See, e.g., MILTON R. WESSEL, THE RULE OF REASON: A NEW APPROACH 
TO CORPORATE LITIGATION 1-31 (1976); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer’s Obligation to 
be Trustworthy When Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REV. 181 (1981) (describ-
ing differences in professional conventions in different types of practice); Donald D. Lan-
don, Clients, Colleagues, and Community: The Shaping of Zealous Advocacy in Country 
Law Practice, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 81 (describing differences between small town 
and big city practice); Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Negotiating Tactics for Legal 
Services Lawyers, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 259 (1973) (describing special tactics available to 
legal services lawyers).  Only the skill of “thinking like a lawyer” cuts across all categories 
of legal work and is performed in the same way everywhere and all of the time.  For descrip-
tions of the “thinking like a lawyer” skill, see Barry B. Boyer & Roger C. Crampton, Ameri-
can Legal Education: An Agenda for Research and Reform, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 270 
(1974); Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. 
REV. 35 (1981); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993). 
32 Professor Hamilton argues that certain fundamental competencies, values, and virtues 
fit all legal work settings and all types of law firms.  He describes these qualities in such 
general terms, however, and in so many different ways, that it is hard to know specifically 
what he has in mind.  Overall, he seems to be saying that law firms and clients prefer to hire 
responsible individuals with well-developed social skills and adult work habits.  See Hamil-
ton, supra note 14, at 25-33.  This is as helpful as it is controversial. 
33 Neil Dilloff, a senior partner in the world’s second largest private law firm, provides a 
list of “top ten” competencies needed to be practice ready.  See Dilloff, supra note 14, at 
438-43.  Reviewing all ten would be unwieldy, so I will limit myself to the first two.  The 
13
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perform on their own, for example, without the guidance and supervi-
sion of experienced mentors?  If so, must they function at the level of 
the “reasonably competent practitioner,” or is it enough that they re-
main above the level of the lowest common denominator?  Must they 
be proficient at their work, or is it enough that they appear profi-
cient?34  Are they “practice ready,” for example, if they can draft a 
coherent and logically organized memorandum or pleading irrespec-
tive of its quality,35 or ask a series of understandable and logically or-
 
“[f]irst, and perhaps foremost” lawyer competency, says Dilloff, is the ability to make judg-
ments.  Id. at 438.  Exercising good judgment, he explains, is “about knowing what is right 
or wrong . . . know[ing] the right way to do things.”  Id.  No doubt this is true, though he 
does not explain how to tell the difference between right and wrong, particularly in hard cas-
es, and that is where most people need help.  As a second point, he recommends that law 
schools teach problem-solving skills.  This is important, he says, because “[t]he only way to 
be able to ‘think out of the box’ is to practice living outside one (or at least expanding the 
size of the box).”  Id. at 438-39.  If one lives outside the box, however, one already thinks 
outside of it, by definition; how to live outside the box is where advice is needed.  Similarly, 
expanding the size of the box would seem to make it more difficult to get outside of it, yet 
Dilloff does not explain how the two instructions are to be coordinated.  The rest of his “top 
ten” discussion is written at the same level of detail. 
 Professor Hamilton also emphasizes the importance of teaching judgment, but he is simi-
larly circumspect about how it is done.  See Hamilton, supra note 14, at 20.  Like Dilloff, he 
is strong on general exhortation and short on operating instructions.  His exhaustive survey 
of the literature on lawyer competencies would be a meta-analysis of the studies in the field 
but for the fact that it contains almost no analysis, even when the study findings he describes 
are confusing or contradictory (e.g., studies finding that law schools are highly rated at 
teaching “legal analysis and legal reasoning” but not highly rated at teaching “substantive 
law,” without discussing how it is possible to do legal analysis without knowing substantive 
law).  See Hamilton, supra note 14, at 21.  No one would argue with recommendations writ-
ten at this level of generality, the problem is in knowing what they mean.  For better efforts, 
see Janet Weinstein et al., Teaching Teamwork to Law Students, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 36, 46-
64 (2013) (describing law school instruction in teamwork skills); Clark D. Cunningham, 
What Do Clients Want From Their Lawyers?, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. 143 (describing methods 
for soliciting client views about lawyer competencies).  Admittedly, it is difficult to describe 
“soft” practice skills, and equally difficult to describe how they could be taught, but unfortu-
nately those are the burdens that come with making the “practice ready” argument.  For the 
most sophisticated effort in this regard, see Marjorie M. Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Identifi-
cation, Development, and Validation of Predictors for Successful Lawyering (Sept. 2008), 
available at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/LSACREPORTfinal-12.pdf (identifying a 
set of twenty-six distinctive lawyer “effectiveness factors”). 
34 The “practice ready” argument seems to demand proficiency at practice skills, not just 
awareness of them.  See supra note 18. 
35 Chris Sevier’s Complaint in his fraudulent representation, products liability, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress diversity action against Apple is a case in point.  The 
Complaint alleges in clear, logically organized, coherent, and sometimes even eloquent 
prose, that Apple’s failure to sell its products in “safe mode,” with its control panels set to 
block pornography websites, “caused him to see pornographic images that appealed to his 
biological sensibilities as a male and lead [sic] him to . . . develop an arousal addiction . . . 
14
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dered questions in an interview or deposition, irrespective of the 
questions’ helpfulness to the case?  Must they be able to teach them-
selves a new body of law over the weekend, adapt standard forms to 
fit a client’s estate plan, do “country conditions” research, trace a 
chain of title in a registry of deeds, file a document with an agency, 
interview a witness, or perform any of the dozens of other such tasks 
assigned to entry-level lawyers (and paralegals) in even mid-size and 
small law firms?36  Someone who cannot do all of these things is not 
“ready” to practice law in one sense of the term, but expecting new 
law graduates to be able to do all of them is wishful thinking.  The 
list of required skills is simply too long.37 
Proponents of “practice-ready” education do not seem to un-
derstand the difference between socialization and education.  Sociali-
zation is the work-based process of internalizing the habits, values, 
beliefs, vocabularies, and motor skills of a profession to make them 
second nature.38  A fully socialized individual is able to use legal 
 
[which caused him] to prefer . . . cyber beauties over his wife . . . his marriage to fail” and 
his wife to “abduct[ ] his son.”  Complaint at 21, Sevier v. Apple Inc., 2013 WL 3063595 
(M.D. Tenn. June 19, 2013) (No. 3:13-cv-00607).  Mr. Sevier, a lawyer (and songwriter), 
may express his ideas skillfully but he is not “practice ready” to draft a Complaint. 
36 One of the most common complaints of lawyers is that law students cannot write.  See 
Dilloff, supra note 14, at 434 (“My observation is that many first year students need to work 
on their writing—some, a lot.”)  Lawyers are not the only ones to make this complaint.  
Teachers at every level of education (elementary school, junior high school, high school, col-
lege, graduate and professional school) say the same thing about the students they inherit 
from the previous level.  While the complaint has some validity in each instance, it has more 
to do with substantive socialization than technical writing skill.  Each time students move to 
a new educational or occupational level, with its own distinctive vocabularies, theoretical 
frameworks, intellectual standards, practice conventions, and the like, they must learn a new 
form of life.  The skills and knowledge that enabled them to be successful at the previous 
level can help them get started at this process, but to become full-fledged members of the 
new environment they must assimilate native-speaker ways of thinking, speaking, and be-
having, and this takes time.  Given this, pointing out that new law graduates cannot write is a 
little like pointing out that babies do not know how to use flatware, or that puppies do not 
know to urinate outside.  These are true points no doubt, but the conditions are not perma-
nent, or anyone’s fault, and they will change if insiders are patient and explain how things 
are done.  Professor Williams pointed this out many years ago, and his is still the single best 
discussion of the topic.  See Joseph M. Williams, On the Maturing of Legal Writers: Two 
Models of Growth and Development, 1 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 1, 13-16 (1991). 
37 See Hamilton, supra note 14, at 5-8 (describing a list of “Common Values, Virtues, Ca-
pacities and Skills” that runs on for several pages). 
38 The socialization process also inculcates what Michael Polyani first famously described 
as “tacit knowledge,” the unwritten practices and conventions that give meaning to 
knowledge in an area of practice or study and that cannot be transmitted explicitly in propo-
sitional form but learned only through the active immersion in shared activities with mem-
15
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knowledge and practice skill to signal to others that he is an insider 
and should be treated as such.  Becoming socialized in a profession is 
a long-term process, however, a consequence of repeated immersion 
in the profession’s tasks, relationships, and body of knowledge.  The 
process has a natural life cycle that cannot be accelerated or repro-
duced (except minimally) by facsimile experiences in schools.  Legal 
education contributes to professional socialization—being a law stu-
dent is itself a type of professional role—but it provides too limited 
an experience of actual law practice to move one very far along in 
that process.  It can apprise students of the skills needed to succeed in 
practice, describe the components of those skills, provide standards 
for evaluating their performance, and show how the skills can be 
adapted to changing circumstances, needs and beliefs, but it cannot 
make students skillful.  That takes longer than an academic semester. 
Schooling and work divide responsibility for the education of 
law students along a kind of understanding/performance line: the 
former provides the background information, theory, and critical 
thinking skills needed to understand the legal system intellectually, 
and the latter provides the opportunity to turn that intellectual under-
standing into behavioral dispositions by putting the understanding in-
to practice.  The two processes interlock and overlap, of course, each 
doing the work of the other on occasion, but at their core they are 
fundamentally different, and cannibalizing one to bolster the other 
will bring the entire system down.  They work in tandem, not in iso-
lation, and each is essential to the development of a professional 
practitioner.39 
Law school clinical instruction brings these two processes to-
gether by having students represent clients in actual cases and review 
 
bers of social groups that possess the tacit knowledge.  See MICHAEL POLYANI, THE TACIT 
DIMENSION 4-5 (1966).  See also MICHAEL POLYANI & AMARTYA SEN, THE TACIT DIMENSION 
4 (2009) (a reissuance of Polyani’s book with a Foreword by Amartya Sen); HARRY COLLINS 
& ROBERT EVANS, RETHINKING EXPERTISE (2007) (applying the concept of tacit knowledge 
to the development of expertise generally); Nicky Priaulx & Martin Weinel, Behavior on a 
Beer Mat: Law, Interdisciplinarity & Expertise, J.L. TECH. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2014), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2405160 (applying the con-
cept of tacit knowledge to the development of legal expertise). 
39 This understanding/performance distinction is similar to the one described by Nicholas 
Lemann between “research,” the pursuit of knowledge and understanding without the con-
straints of immediate practical applicability, and “mass higher education,” the low cost train-
ing in consensus practical skills.  See Nicholas Lemann, The Soul of the Research University, 
THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 28, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/The-Soul-of-
the-Research/146155?cid=megamenu. 
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their efforts with supervisors against explicit standards of competent 
performance.  The distinctive feature of this type of instruction is its 
ability to confront its subject both methodologically and substantive-
ly: to analyze skills while actually using them.  Students work on 
problems in the first person, in lawyer role, in the full richness of re-
al-life factual situations, with the ready-made pressures that responsi-
bility for the interests of others produces.  They make choices and 
judgments to a degree absent in other types of instruction and live 
with the consequences.  This makes the issue of responsibility a 
meaningful concern.40  The driving force in this process is the dy-
namic of role adjustment and the need it generates to understand and 
justify one’s actions.41  Performing unfamiliar tasks under expert ob-
servation, with real interests at stake, requires a cognitive framework 
that reduces the anxiety unfamiliarity generates and gives consistency 
and coherence to one’s behavior.  Since this process is tied intimately 
to a sense of self, the motivational energy generated is very high.42 
 
40 Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical Ed-
ucation as Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 374, 384-85, 391 
(Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility ed., 1973).  See also Michael 
Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Report from a CLEPR Colony, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 581, 585-86 
(1976): 
Issues of . . . responsibility . . . loom large on the clinical agenda . . . . 
Should they [the students] drown adversary litigators in a sea of paper-
work, lie to adversaries for bargaining advantage, or decide, as a legal 
aid lawyer, to represent one type of client rather than another when re-
sources are too scarce to represent both?  Clinical courses are superior 
vehicles for sensitizing students to these issues, because the student must 
actually make a choice among competing options.  Unlike the student in 
a classroom, he cannot stop after pointing out the risks and costs inherent 
in each available course of action, but must actually select one of them, 
execute it, and incur the associated costs.  His decision may well be irre-
versible, and he will have to live with its consequences for weeks or 
months thereafter. 
Id. 
 Dean Gerard Nash of the Monash University in Melbourne put the point succinctly: “Re-
sponsibility cannot be simulated . . . .”  William Pincus, Text of Remarks at the Annual 
Luncheon of the Association of American Law Schools—January 4, 1980, in WILLIAM 
PINCUS, CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR LAW STUDENTS 425 (1980) (quoting Gerard Nash). 
41 As Professor Bellow once put it: “experience produces a qualitative change in the mode 
and content of knowing, which cannot be replicated by the transmission of information or 
the discussion of cases . . . in a classroom.  The way in which legal concepts and ideas are 
understood after they have been used . . . ‘feel[s]’ differently in a sense that is not fully ex-
plained by the fact that they are more readily remembered.”  Bellow, supra note 40, at 382. 
42 Id. at 383-85.  These epistemological and motivational consequences alter the profes-
sor-student relationship in profound ways.  In classroom instruction students often are unable 
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Underlying this process are two foundational premises, one 
psychological and the other philosophical.  The psychological prem-
ise grows out of the work of Erik Erikson and has to do with the way 
that adults develop identity.43  Personality is not well set by the time a 
student enters law school.44  Our society prolongs the development of 
identity45 by extending formal education well beyond adolescence.46  
This in turn delays role commitments, including occupational com-
mitments, attendant upon adult status and creates a space in which 
educational instruction can have a significant developmental impact.  
Because law students do not usually think explicitly about their roles 
as lawyers, the construction of their professional identities results 
largely from the emulation of role models—those who are respected, 
or in some cases feared or hated, for their performance of practice 
tasks.47  Clinical practice instruction provides students with models of 
technically competent lawyer behavior and the opportunity to try out 
that behavior under expert guidance to make it part of their personali-
ty.  In theory, little could be done to improve upon such a design.48 
 
to judge the effectiveness of professor behavior, in part because of the absence of any shared 
frame of reference within which to form and express their views.  Practice instruction pro-
vides this frame of reference, in the form of a shared law-practice world in which students 
gain confidence, knowledge, and critical perspective through the performance with their pro-
fessors of lawyer practice tasks.  This, in turn, increases their understanding and scrutiny of 
professor actions and pronouncements and frees them to judge those actions and pro-
nouncements critically. 
43 ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1994); ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY AND 
THE LIFE CYCLE (1994). 
44 Not everyone agrees with this.  See, e.g., James J. White, The Anatomy of a Clinical 
Law Course, in CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE 158, 171 (Ed-
mund W. Kitch ed., 1970) (“Only a fool would suggest that . . . [a] law teacher could recast a 
twenty year old liar or do much else about the fundamental values which his environment 
has instilled in him.”).  See also Brainerd Currie, Reflections on the Course in the Legal Pro-
fession, 22 J. LEGAL EDUC. 48 (1969); James E. Starrs, Crossing a Pedagogical Hellespont 
via the Pervasive System, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365 (1965).  Some law professors claim that 
they can shape the professional behavior but not personal behavior of students.  The nature 
of this distinction is not self-evident.  See MICHAEL J. KELLY, LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL 
EDUCATION 38 (1980). 
45 Identity is “the sense of self, formed from emotionally significant relationships with 
others which shape one’s being and one’s image of self . . . .”  Andrew S. Watson, Lawyers 
and Professionalism: A Further Psychiatric Perspective on Legal Education, 8 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 248, 250 (1975). 
46 Alan Stone calls this a “crucial variation” in our culture and “an entirely new phenome-
non in the history of civilization.”  Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. 
L. REV. 392, 399 (1971). 
47 Watson, supra note 45, at 250; see also Bellow, supra note 40, at 381. 
48 Things do not always go as well in practice as theory suggests they should.  See Con-
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The philosophical premise underlying practice instruction 
traces its roots to Aristotle49 and has to do with the way that virtue is 
known.  It holds that only someone who has had the experience of 
acting in a certain way is capable of understanding that way of acting.  
Understanding is arrived at by reflecting on activities that have been 
experienced pre-reflectively and internalized as habits.  Critical re-
flection on habits, to harmonize behavior with belief, is an important 
but chronologically second step in the process.  The neophyte need 
not (and in fact cannot) be aware at first of why the acts he imitates 
are virtuous or skillful; it is enough that he knows that people regard-
ed as virtuous and skillful behave in that way.  Only after reflecting 
on behaving in this way does the virtuous and skillful nature of the 
behavior become clear, and at that point the behavior becomes a dis-
position.  Until disposition is present, however, the character of ac-
tion cannot be fully understood.50 
Given this epistemology, it is not hard to see how law school 
clinical practice instruction was thought to provide an ideal setting 
for the development of lawyer practice skills and values.  In practice 
courses students are able to imitate the behavior of skillful and virtu-
ous lawyers responding to real problems and reflect on their (the stu-
dents’) efforts under the guidance of experts using explicit concep-
tions of competent practice.  By experiencing and reflecting on what 
it is to act skillfully and ethically, students are thought to be able to 
develop an understanding of competent professional practice and act 
in accordance with it.  Again, in theory, little could be done to im-
prove upon such a design. 
The problem, of course, is that the time frame of a law school 
semester does not permit this process to play out to any significant 
extent.  Acting in lawyer role for thirteen weeks (or even an academic 
year), does not provide an opportunity to observe, imitate, reflect on, 
and internalize the skills and values of professional practice to any 
substantial extent.  Students will be novices at the end of this process 
 
dlin, Moral Failure, supra note 4, at 324-32 (criticizing the models of effective practice 
demonstrated in some parts of clinical education). 
49 See, e.g., SIR DAVID ROSS, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 28-39 (1975).  See 
also M.F. Burnyeat, Aristotle on Learning to Be Good, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS 69 
(Amélie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980). 
50 The skill learned in this process is that of practical judgment, the capacity to decide 
what to do when different sorts of objectives and values, not all of them commensurable, 
bear upon the same situation. 
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as much as at the beginning, advanced novices perhaps, but novices 
nonetheless.  They will have seen only a small number of lawyer 
skills and values in operation and have had almost no chance to try 
them out with the frequency needed to make them dispositions.  Giv-
en the limited opportunity to practice provided by practice instruc-
tion, therefore, it is unrealistic to expect law students to be “practice 
ready” by the time they graduate from law school.  They may have 
stood for the first time, but they will not yet be out of the crib.51 
If actual practice instruction cannot make students practice 
ready, instruction based on simulated practice experience is even less 
likely to do so.  Simulated experiences are easier to construct and 
administer than actual practice experiences, and thus can be used to 
provide more extensive opportunities to try out lawyer skill tasks, but 
simulated experiences are useful mostly for teaching the motor skill 
dimension of lawyer tasks.  They lack the real life emotional, psycho-
logical, and informational content needed to permit students to make 
 
51 This is not an argument against practice-based instruction in general.  Practice skill 
cannot be learned independently of activity.  Without the requisite experience even an intel-
lectually gifted person is incapable of behaving skillfully.  Since practice courses help one 
begin to develop skills, such courses are an important part of a law school curriculum.  My 
point is simply that they should not be the dominant part of that curriculum, or play a larger 
role than they do in most law schools at the present time.  See Lande, supra note 4, at 5 
(“[L]aw schools have revised their curricula in the last decade to increase practical educa-
tion.  Under A.B.A. Standard 302(a)(4), students were required to receive ‘substantial in-
struction’ in ‘professional skills’ . . . [and] the A.B.A. . . . found that most law schools [meet] 
this requirement . . . .”) (footnote omitted).  See also Sheldon Krantz & Michael A. Mille-
mann, Legal Education in Transition: Trends and Their Implications, NEB. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2510609 
(describing “significant recent changes in legal education that have added practice-based 
courses, or practice-based components to courses, in all three years of legal education”).  
The ABA has changed its views on the adequacy of practice instruction programs over the 
years and now believes that law schools are not doing as much as they should in that regard.  
See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 2 (“[L]aw schools have done much to expand . . . op-
portunities [for skills training and experiential learning, but] [t]here is [the] need to do 
more.”).  Consequently, it recently changed the law school accreditation standards to require 
six hours of experiential learning credit as a condition of graduation.  See http://www.ameri 
canbar.org/groups/legal_education/committees/standards_review.html (Report of the ABA 
Standards Review Committee on the Implementation of New Standards and Rules for Ap-
proval of Law Schools ); http://www. americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal 
_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/201406_revised_st
andards_clean_copy.authcheckdam.pdf (Revised Standards for Approval of Law Schools); 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admission
s_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/2014_hod_standards_concurrence_announce
ment.authcheckdam.pdf (Notice of approval of Revised Standards and Rules by the ABA 
House of Delegates). 
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the judgments involved in deciding how to proceed in the first in-
stance.  Take client or witness questioning as an example.  It is a rela-
tively simple thing to teach someone to ask questions in a clear and 
understandable form.  One needs only to have the person rehearse the 
questions over and over again—eliminating dependent clauses, big 
windups, preemptive apologies and explanations, rising inflection, 
qualifiers and modifiers, unintended pauses, inappropriate pace, inter-
ruptions, filibusters, and the like—until the questions are direct, clear, 
and succinct.  This aspect of question asking is learned in the same 
manner as athletic technique—by repetition and critique.  But simu-
lated question asking is to actual question asking what batting prac-
tice is to hitting in an actual baseball game.  The physical part is the 
same, but the judgments involved in determining how to proceed are 
not.  Real life questioning must take the other person’s emotional and 
intellectual states into account, as well as the circumstances that af-
fect the person’s willingness and ability to respond fully and accu-
rately to one’s questions.  Simulated question asking does not provide 
the contextual richness needed to do this.52 
In the end, however, these concerns are largely beside the 
point.  The argument for “practice ready” graduates is not driven by a 
desire to prepare law students for practice as much as one to shift the 
cost of new lawyer training from law firms to law schools.  Increas-
ingly, clients with leverage (Biglaw clients in particular) are unwill-
ing to permit new law firm associates to work on their projects;53 they 
will not pay for on-the-job training.54  In the old days, law firms saw 
 
52 Neil Dilloff suggests that field trips to clients’ offices and visits from “outside business 
people, government officials, and others to discuss and simulate client conferences, strategy 
meetings, and problem solving,” will “resonate” with students and leave lasting impressions.  
See Dilloff, supra note 14, at 437-38, 439, and 448.  Perhaps this is true for people who be-
lieve in “Road to Damascus” moments, but most people learn skills by actively practicing 
them, not by listening to war stories, or watching dog and pony shows.  There is no voyeur 
form of experiential learning. 
53 David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-law-school-associates-learn-to-
be-lawyers.html (citing American Lawyer survey that found that “47 percent of law firms 
had a client say, in effect, ‘We don’t want to see the names of first or second-year associates 
on our bills.’ ”). 
54 See Leipold, supra note 10, at 8 (“[C]orporate clients continue to be unwilling to absorb 
th[e] costs [of training new lawyers.]”); Dilloff, supra note 14, at 446 (“[clients] don’t want 
to pay for a new way to ‘learn on the job.’  They want law schools to have already trained 
the new lawyer.”)  Dilloff doubles down on the claim, adding that “graduates and employ-
ers” also want law schools to do the training.  Id.  (“[T]he desires of all three constituencies . 
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new lawyer training as their responsibility, and some still do,55 but 
now that they are ranked publicly according to several measures of 
profitability56 most firms are looking for ways to cut costs, and one 
popular strategy is to pass the expense of training new lawyers on to 
the next person in line; and law school is that next person.  The push 
for practice ready graduates should be seen for what it is, therefore, a 
move by law firms to save money,57 not a program for improving the 
education of law students.58 
 
. . [is that] new lawyer [skills] should be taught in law school . . . .”), but this is a little self-
serving.  Clients do not want to pay for training, that much is clear, but it does not follow 
that they care one way or another about whether law schools or law firms pay for it.  They 
have no stake in that argument.  Graduates also could not care less about who pays as long as 
they are trained.  Dilloff is right that “employers” (i.e., law firms), do not want to pay for 
training, but his curiously circumspect way of making that point reminds one of Priscilla 
Mullins’ question to John Alden.  See Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, The Courtship of 
Miles Standish, in HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW, POEMS AND OTHER WRITINGS 280, 
294 (2000) (“Why don’t you speak for yourself, John?”). 
55 See Dilloff, supra note 14, at 431-32 (describing a law firm “grace period” in “the old 
days” in which “the new lawyer’s primary job was to learn, . . . [but] [t]oday, things are 
much different”). 
56 See The 2014 Am Law 200, AM. LAW., May 29, 2014, http://www.americanlawyer.com/ 
PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202494427064&The_2014_Am_Law_200 (rankings of law firms 
according to “Gross Revenue, Profits Per Partner, Revenue Per Lawyer”).  See also Dilloff, 
supra note 14, at 432 (“[T]oday’s economics of law do not permit extensive non-billable 
training.”); id. n.28 (“Escalating salaries and associate turnover require that entry-level attor-
neys generate substantial billable hours from the day they walk in the office and begin con-
suming expensive overhead.”) (quoting Robert W. Hillman, The Hidden Costs of Lawyer 
Mobility: Of Law Firms, Law Schools, and the Education of Lawyers, 91 KY. L.J. 299, 303-
04 (2002).  Gilding the lily, Dilloff blames even the Howrey collapse, at least in part, on the 
failure to transfer new lawyer training costs.  Dilloff, supra note 14, at 432 n.26 (describing 
how Howrey tried to maintain a new lawyer training program and “[the firm] is now defunct 
. . . .  [The program] turned out to be a luxury that the firm could not afford.”).  New lawyer 
training costs were the least of Howrey’s problems. 
57 There is a contradiction, of course, in both wanting law schools to pay for training and 
not trusting law schools to train.  See supra note 30 (describing how law firms do not give 
skills instruction great weight in the hiring decision).  It is not uncommon for “espoused the-
ory” and “theory in use” (as Chris Argyris and Donald Schön used to put it) to contradict one 
another in the lives of individuals, so I suppose it should not be surprising to find the same 
contradiction in the lives of law firms as well.  Alan Frost, Organizational Learning Theory 
from a Company-Wide Perspective, KMT, http://www.knowledge-managementtools.net/ 
organizational-learning-theory.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). 
58 The ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education concedes as much.  See AM. 
BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 16 (“[I]n the second half of the twentieth century . . . [t]he legal 
profession increasingly began to assign, or try to assign, more responsibility to law schools 
for the practical and business aspects of the education of lawyers, mainly for economic rea-
sons (including unwillingness [sic] of clients to subsidize the education of new lawyers.”)).  
Mark Price, the labor economist, put the point succinctly.  He said: “it is at least comforting 
to know that law firms are not that different from firms in Manufacturing or Health Care[;] 
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Unfortunately for law firms, the strategy cannot work.  Law 
schools cannot teach students how to find mentors, coordinate para-
legal assignments with other lawyers, share secretaries with partners, 
secure the best work assignments, or do any of the dozens of other 
such practical tasks that are needed in firms “on day one of their first 
full time job.”59  These are situation-specific skills that require local 
knowledge, on-site experience, and insider help, and law schools 
cannot reproduce the circumstances and conditions in which they are 
learned.60  They cannot recreate the complex personal histories, insti-
tutional arrangements, power structures, and practical incentives and 
constraints that characterize even the simplest law firm practice set-
ting, and to insist that they do that is a little like insisting that they 
suspend the laws of physics.  It is easy to understand why firms 
would want to shift the cost of training new lawyers, but why they 
think they should be able to do it is baffling.  They seem to believe 
 
that is[,] they would prefer that somebody else pay for the skills that make them profitable.”  
Frank Pasquale, New York Times Financial Advice: Be an Unpaid Intern Through Your 20s 
(Then Work till You’re 100), CONCURRING OPINIONS (Nov. 20, 2011), http://www.concurring 
opinions.com/archives/2011/11/new-york-times-financial-advice-be-an-unpaid-intern-
through-your-20s-then-work-till-youre-100.html (quoting Mark Price).  See also Diamond, 
supra note 21, at 4-5 (“Under tremendous economic pressure today, on a global scale, capital 
is looking for ways to cut costs, particularly legal costs.”).  It is a sad statement about the 
contemporary legal world that many in the profession, professors and lawyers alike, seem to 
think that law schools exist solely to satisfy the needs of law firms.  Legal education has ob-
ligations to law, legal institutions, and individual students that are equal to, and different 
from, its obligations to firms. 
59 See Dilloff, supra note 14, at 429: 
A person is “ready to practice” if she knows “how to deal with her secre-
tary (who also services three other lawyers, including a senior partner) 
and her paralegal (who also works for five other lawyers, including two 
partners), has her eye out for a potential mentor, has the ‘people skills’ to 
seek out the right lawyers for whom to work, has an ability to ferret out 
the type of assignments she likes and clients for whom she wishes to 
work, and has developed a can-do pleasant attitude[.]  [Without these 
skills] all the ‘book learning’ in law school will be of secondary im-
portance.” 
Id. at 430-31. 
60 The same is true for the suggestion that law schools should teach students “business 
sense.”  Business sense is developed by representing business clients, and law school prac-
tice courses do not provide much of an opportunity to do this (there are a few limited excep-
tions).  If they tried, the organized Bar would object, since most businesses can pay for rep-
resentation.  Law schools can offer courses and programs in conjunction with business 
schools, of course, and many do, but I take it the “business sense” recommended by Dilloff 
and Hamilton refers to business sense of the “client identification and loyalty” kind, and that 
“sense” can be learned only by working for actual clients. 
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that it is possible to have a world in which there are only benefits and 
no burdens, only income and no expenses, but this vision of law firm 
nirvana does not exist.  Firms will have to bear some of the cost of 
new lawyer training whether they want to or not. 
Proponents of “practice ready” education want to change the 
nature of law school radically, not just add a few skills courses to the 
curriculum.  Skills courses have been around for decades they argue, 
and yet most law school graduates still are not “practice ready.”  In 
their view, law schools need to reverse the traditional instructional 
hierarchy, to make skills instruction the central theme and “thinking 
like a lawyer” the subplot.  The problem with this argument is that it 
is based on a kind of worker-bee myopia that fails to understand edu-
cation’s principal contribution to development: to provide students 
with the knowledge and critical thinking skills needed to adapt re-
ceived wisdom to changing circumstances, beliefs, and needs over 
time.  For legal education that means help law students devise more 
effective ways to structure law and legal institutions and live worth-
while professional lives.  Reducing legal education to motor skill 
training is just another example of the destructive short-term thinking 
that pervades the present day worlds of law and business. 
III. “THINKING LIKE A LAWYER” IS THE ULTIMATE PRACTICE 
SKILL 
There is a more substantial objection to the argument for 
“practice ready” graduates, however, than the fact that law schools 
cannot produce them.  Increasing the time spent training students in 
practice skills will divert attention and resources from what law 
schools do best: teach the critical thinking skills that underlie and 
give shape to lawyer practice behavior generally.  Helping students 
learn to “think like a lawyer,” as the expression goes,61 is the most 
 
61 The term usually is defined to include analytical and analogical reasoning, theory build-
ing, the interpretation of texts, instrumental and strategic reasoning, and persuasive argu-
ment.  See Fried, supra note 31; Sunstein, supra note 31.  Dean Arthurs has pointed out the 
essential connection between these reasoning skills and substantive knowledge.  See Harry 
Arthurs, The Future of Legal Education: Three Visions and a Prediction 6 (Osgoode CLPE 
Res. Paper No. 49/2013, Sept. 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2349633 (describing law schools as “knowledge communities” that “exist to 
collect, critique, produce and disseminate knowledge”).  Ironically, critical thinking skills, in 
one or another variation, are usually listed as among the important lawyer competencies used 
to support the case for “practice ready” graduates.  See Hamilton, supra note 14, at 5, 6, 12, 
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important contribution law schools can make to professional devel-
opment.  “Thinking like a lawyer” is the ultimate practice skill and 
for law schools to reduce the attention given to developing it would 
be a self-inflicted wound of immense proportions.62 
Both in presenting their own work and evaluating the work of 
others, lawyers use a set of skills they refined (and sometimes learned 
for the first time) in law school: reasoning analogically, analyzing 
facts, synthesizing principles, devising ends-means strategies, inter-
preting texts, marshaling reasons and evidence to support arguments, 
and the like.63  These skills underlie and direct even the most mun-
dane law practice tasks, from scanning a deposition transcript for is-
sues to argue; reviewing a contract for errors and omissions; eliciting 
witness testimony to support a theory of the case; interviewing a cli-
ent to determine if he has a claim; choosing a strategy for gaining 
leverage in negotiation;64 or making an argument to an adversary, 
mediator, bureaucrat, colleague, client, witness, judge, or clerk.  Each 
of these tasks begins with and is grounded in an understanding of the 
background normative standards and practical constraints that govern 
the issues under consideration and define the parties’ options.  With-
out this understanding a lawyer’s behavior would be only coinci-
dentally effective.65 
Take the client interview as a case in point.  A client might 
tell a jumbled, partial, or confusing story about something that hap-
pened to him and ask if he had any legal rights in the matter.  A law-
 
21 (describing survey results in which “analytical skills,” “analysis and reasoning,” and 
“ability in legal analysis and legal reasoning” are listed as among the most important lawyer 
competencies). 
62 See Barton, supra note 1, at 39 (“[C]orporate clients are seeking . . . not their time, but 
their insights” from lawyers.).  See also Michelle M. Harner, The Value of ‘Thinking Like a 
Lawyer,’ 70 MD. L. REV. 390 (2011) (describing thinking like a lawyer as the “hallmark” of 
being a lawyer). 
63 Law schools are able to teach these skills at sophisticated levels because the conditions 
needed for high-level thinking are present in schools to the same extent that they are present 
in practice. 
64 Reconciling interests, if you are a communitarian.  See Robert J. Condlin, Every Day 
and in Every Way We Are All Becoming Meta and Meta, or How Communitarian Bargaining 
Theory Conquered the World (of Bargaining Theory), 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 231, 
236-44 (2008) (describing communitarian bargaining). 
65 Law school graduates often take their critical reasoning skills for granted, believing that 
they had them when they entered law school.  It is one of the many ironies of the present day 
critique of legal education that critics use skills learned in law school to criticize law schools 
for failing to teach them skills. 
25
Condlin: A Millennialist Fantasy
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
100 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
 
yer would need to ask about the relevant factual details the client did 
not provide on his own, organize and evaluate the story to determine 
if a legal remedy was available, predict the chances of a successful 
recovery, and calculate the cost of obtaining it, all before being able 
to say anything helpful to the client about what he might do.  The 
lawyer could try to learn this information and do this analysis using a 
standard set of questions and rules of thumb put together somewhat 
serendipitously from practice manuals, past experiences, other law-
yers’ tips, and the like, but this would treat the client’s story as gener-
ic, miss its idiosyncratic features, and guarantee only that the lawyer 
could complete the interview, not conduct it skillfully.  Questioning 
in a boilerplate manner like this often amounts to little more than 
practicing mistakes (one’s own and others’), under the guise of fol-
lowing received wisdom. 
To be truly effective, the lawyer’s inquiries and analysis 
would need to be adapted to the circumstances of the case, and to 
make those adaptations he would need to understand the legal and 
practical norms that govern the situation and the wide variety of ways 
in which they could be interpreted and used.  There is a direct con-
nection in interview questioning, in other words, between ideas in the 
head and questions out of the mouth.  Questions are the end product 
of an analytical process that is no less important because it operates 
below the surface and is taken for granted.  The ability to ask ques-
tions in a confident and engaging manner is a far less useful skill than 
the ability to think of what questions to ask in the first instance.66  If 
one had to choose between form and substance (though the choice is 
rarely quite that stark), an awkwardly asked question that is on point 
is preferable to a stylishly asked question that is irrelevant.  The for-
mer may have only a small chance of being helpful, but the latter has 
none.  Only lawyers who can think like lawyers can ask questions 
like lawyers. 
Legal negotiation provides another example.  At its core, ne-
gotiation is an advocacy process.  Judgments about acceptable out-
comes inevitably are based on comparisons of proposals on the table 
with available alternatives.67  The best negotiators use normative 
 
66 But see Dilloff, supra note 14, at 434 (“Law schools . . . must . . . teach . . . their stu-
dents . . . how to say something in addition to what to say.”). 
67 Professors Fisher and Ury famously labeled the alternative to a negotiated agreement as 
a BATNA, a “best alternative to negotiated agreement.”  ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, 
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standards to make these comparisons, so that their agreements are not 
the product of routine, arbitrariness, power, or fortuity.68  Lawyers 
usually disagree about normative standards, however, both their 
meaning and application, and to resolve these disagreements they 
discuss their competing views until they reach some sort of mutually 
acceptable understanding (even if it is only to agree to disagree).  A 
negotiator who is able to persuade the other side to see things his way 
in these discussions, everything else equal, does better than a negotia-
tor who is not. 
Negotiation usually is personal and conducted in private, and 
these qualities make the stylized properties of public advocacy both 
rude and ineffective.  The best negotiators discuss their differences in 
a conversational manner,69 expanding one another’s understanding of 
the problem rather than dismissing their different views out of hand.  
They try to inform and instruct more than impress and compete, and 
to create doubt in pre-negotiation assessments more than capitulation 
to a superior view.  In a real sense, they act as both colleagues and 
adversaries, searching for outcomes in their mutual interest while try-
ing to bend those outcomes to their individual advantage.  While 
conversational, therefore, negotiation also is substantive.70  A skillful 
negotiator does not try to turn a weak claim into a strong one by us-
ing socio-psychological tricks, clever word play, or rhetorical force.  
Instead, he invents more and better arguments, and supports them 
with more and better reasons, than his counterpart on the other side.  
He convinces his adversary, not that he is the better negotiator, but 
that he has the stronger case.71  Advocacy of this sort depends upon 
the ability to spot issues, generate arguments, and analyze problems 
from a greater number of perspectives than an adversary.  A negotia-
 
GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 101-11 (1981).  I focus on 
dispute negotiation in the example given, but advocacy plays an important role in transac-
tional negotiation as well.  See Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative 
Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REV. 1, 3-11 (1992) (describing 
the differences between dispute settlement and transactional negotiation).  In commercial 
transactions the terms of a deal usually depend upon what is regarded as the “market” for 
that particular type of deal at that particular time, but what is “market” changes frequently 
and its present meaning is always subject to debate. 
68 See Condlin, Bargaining Without Law, supra note 14, at 303-06 (describing the differ-
ent bases on which disputes may be resolved informally). 
69 See id. at 310-26 (describing conversational advocacy). 
70 See id. at 313-16 (describing the substantive properties of conversational argument). 
71 See id. at 324. 
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tor who does this will be deferred to when it comes time to settle, and 
a negotiator who is deferred to will get better results.  When personal 
qualities and practical factors are held equal, effective negotiation has 
almost a one-for-one relationship with skillful legal analysis and ar-
gument.72  One needs to think like a lawyer, in other words, to nego-
tiate like a lawyer. 
Practice readiness also requires an understanding of lawyer 
role as much as a command of lawyer practice skill.  For most stu-
dents, law school will be the last good opportunity to consider in de-
tail, relatively unconstrained by financial, familial or psychological 
factors, how best to live their lives as lawyers: what ends to serve, 
what interests to defend and advance, and what principles to stand 
for.  Law schools have an obligation to help students think through 
these questions, identifying the various paths available in legal work 
and constructing standards for choosing among them.  As part of this 
obligation, they need to encourage students to ask themselves, albeit 
provisionally, where they fit in professional life (or if they fit at all), 
and to what types of settings they are best suited.73  Practice itself 
does not provide many opportunities or incentives for considering 
these questions, or much help in answering them. 
Not all students will be interested in issues of professional 
role, of course; many will be pre-occupied with technique.  That is 
the novice’s curse.  But that is not an argument against organizing le-
gal instruction around them.  Issues of role pervade law practice and 
someone interested in a satisfying career as a lawyer must come to 
grips with them or risk being rudderless in professional life.74  From a 
 
72 It is widely believed that negotiation is mostly bluff and bluster and that the discussion 
of substantive concerns plays a small and not very important part.  This can be true, and will 
be if one does not insist on more, but when bluff and bluster confront reasons and evidence, 
each advanced with equal force, reasons and evidence win.  To think otherwise is to believe 
that substantive law is irrelevant to legal disputes when substantive law defines legal dis-
putes.  I discuss this topic at length in Condlin, Bargaining Without Law, supra note 14, at 
298-309. 
73 Neil Dilloff recommends using practitioners to help examine these questions.  See 
Dilloff, supra note 14, at 453 (“There is nothing like spending ten minutes with a senior 
practitioner, government official, in-house counsel, or law firm partner to get a truer picture 
of what practicing law means in different roles.”).  He has a somewhat exaggerated view of 
the teaching potential of ten minutes, even for “senior practitioners,” but his claim is true if 
read literally and the phrase “nothing like” is emphasized. 
74 See David L. Chambers, Satisfaction in the Practice of Law: Findings from a Long 
Term Study of Attorneys’ Careers 2 (Univ. Mich. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
No. 330, May 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=227 
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law school’s perspective, students who confront such issues will be 
better adjusted and more thoughtful lawyers than students who do 
not, and adding even a small number of better adjusted and more 
thoughtful lawyers to the profession is better than adding a legion of 
unthinking automatons with virtuoso motor skills.75  Even students 
who believe they know how they want to live their professional lives 
will benefit from testing their views.  If the views are well founded, 
testing will confirm them, and if they are not, testing will be a life-
saver.  Providing a forum for the critical examination of how to live 
one’s life as a lawyer is one of the most important contributions law 
schools can make to the development of students.  To shortchange the 
examination of that issue in order to prepare students to navigate the 
currents, shoals, and reefs of law office politics would be perverse. 
IV. WHY SKILLS INSTRUCTION HAS ALWAYS BEEN A HARD 
SELL IN THE LEGAL ACADEMY 
The campaign to expand the place of skills instruction in the 
law school curriculum has met with mixed success over the years and 
this makes it somewhat of an anomaly in law school curricular re-
form.  Other reform projects, and there have been many, have re-
ceived clear up or down votes, becoming full citizens of the law 
school or disappearing altogether (some doing both).  Each has had 
its probationary period when acceptance hung in the balance, but un-
like skills instruction, each eventually has been taken in or kicked 
out.  Yet, after all these years, skills instruction remains in a kind of 
curricular limbo, its status still the subject of intense debate.  How 
can this be explained?76 
 
4162 (survey of Michigan Law graduates found that “overall work satisfaction [was] much 
more closely related to perceptions of the social value of their work and the quality of their 
relations with co-workers than it [was] to their satisfaction with income or their prestige in 
the community”).  See also DANIEL H. PINK, DRIVE 99 (2009) (describing the importance of 
autonomy to career satisfaction and the law firm billable hour as “perhaps the most autono-
my-crushing mechanism imaginable”); Steven J. Harper, A Dangerous, Million-Dollar Law 
School Distraction, AM. LAW. DAILY (July 26, 2013), http://www.americanlawyer.com/Pub 
ArticleALD.jsp?id=1202612503156&A_Dangerous_MillionDollar_Law_School_Distra-
ction&slreturn=20130626132953 (“Anyone desiring to become an attorney shouldn’t do it 
for the money.”). 
75 See Konefsky & Sullivan, supra note 17, at 2 (“The real task of legal education must be 
to prepare students, as best we can, for a lifetime of successful, ethical, and personally re-
warding practice.”). 
76 The history of clinical legal education does not offer much help with this question.  Af-
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Part of the answer, no doubt, lies in the nature of skills in-
struction itself.  To some extent it is an alien element in the world of 
legal education.  Historically, legal education has been about the 
study of law, its content, nature, and effects, the interests it serves, 
and the extent to which it embodies and effectuates the normative 
commitments of the society.  The goal in such study is intellectual 
understanding, and the skills most directly implicated are analysis 
and research.  Skills instruction, on the other hand, is about what law 
delivers more than what it promises and legal education always has 
been concerned more with promise than delivery. 
One way to understand the legal academy’s reluctance to em-
brace skills instruction is to identify the common properties of suc-
cessful curricular reform efforts in the past, to see if they define a tac-
it standard of acceptance, and then hold skills instruction up to that 
standard.  The first step in doing this, constructing a consensus list of 
successful reforms, is itself controversial.  Many legal academics still 
see doctrinal analysis and statutory interpretation as the only true sub-
jects of law study, and dismiss everything else as marginal, faddish, 
or irrelevant.  Others see only their own particular policy or modeling 
projects as fully assimilated and everything else as temporary or shal-
low.  Sometimes it is difficult even to determine what counts as a re-
form: does it include a marginal extension of, or improvement on, an 
original theory, for example, or must it offer a wholly distinctive 
view?  However one answers these questions, there have been several 
undeniable reforms of the American law school curriculum over the 
years (albeit sometimes temporary), and most of them have been pro-
 
ter much huffing and puffing in the 1960s and 1970s, clinical and traditional law faculty 
members reached a kind of educational cease-fire, agreeing to co-exist but not necessarily to 
think kindly of one another.  The cease-fire was not memorialized in any formal document 
and it was not reached at the same time in all law schools.  Instead, it just sort of happened, 
serendipitously and irregularly as law faculty members, clinical and traditional alike, started 
to live with one another side by side (or more accurately, floor by floor, or building by build-
ing), if not harmoniously, at least in mutual toleration.  While not ideal, this seemed to work 
but, sadly, it was not destined to last.  Perhaps peace was just too lifeless, too unprincipled, 
or too low-tech for some, but whatever the reason, the pot was stirred again by the MacCrate 
and Carnegie Reports (and now, the Task Force on Legal Education), and the game was back 
on.  See MACCRATE, supra note 30; EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW (William M. Sullivan et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE].  
Throughout all of this ferment “thinking like a lawyer” has remained first among equals in 
the spectrum of legal educational goals, but the millennialist revival of this never-ending sto-
ry has placed that status in jeopardy once again.  Somewhere, the ghosts of Marx and Santa-
yana must be chuckling. 
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duced either by a “law and . . .” movement of some sort, or a critical 
jurisprudential school of thought.  My own list would include the 
programs in law and policy sciences, 77 law and social sciences,78 law 
and philosophy,79 law and economics,80 and law and health scienc-
es,81 as well as the critical jurisprudential schools of legal realism,82 
 
77 See, e.g., Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Poli-
cy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943); Myres S. McDou-
gal, The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy Science in the World 
Community, 56 YALE L.J. 1345 (1947).  See also STEVENS, supra note 4, at 265-70 (describ-
ing “Law, Science, and Policy” approach to law study).  The first successful curricular re-
form of legal education was the case method itself, but I will treat that as the slate on which 
successive reform projects have written.  See STEVENS, supra note 4, at 36, 38, 52-56, 60-63, 
122-23 (describing the introduction of the case method in American law schools). 
78 This category includes courses of instruction associated with the Law & Society move-
ment, see Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763 
(1986); John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Science Research in Law: A New Para-
digm, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 465 (1988), as well as those of earlier Sociological Jurispru-
dence.  See Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. 
L. REV. 489 (1912).  It also includes courses of instruction in Law and Psycholo-
gy/Psychiatry.  See, e.g., Stone, supra note 44; Andrew S. Watson, The Quest for Profes-
sional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 91 
(1968). 
79 See STEVENS, supra note 4, at 274-75; Martha C. Nussbaum, The Use and Abuse of Phi-
losophy in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1627 (1993); Symposium, Contemporary Le-
gal Theory, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441 (1986); William Twining, Academic Law and Legal Phi-
losophy: The Significance of Herbert Hart, 95 L.Q. REV. 557 (1979). 
80 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (1988); A. MITCHELL 
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992); Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: 
Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974); James Boyd White, Econom-
ics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN. L. REV. 161 (1986). 
81 LAW, MIND, AND BRAIN (Oliver R. Goodenough & Michael Freeman eds., 2009); 
LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN ET AL., LAW AND THE HEALTH SYSTEM (2014); Oliver R. Goodenough 
& Micaela Tucker, Law and Cognitive Neuroscience, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 61 (2010); 
Owen D. Jones, Seven Ways Neuroscience Aids Law, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE HUMAN 
PERSON: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ACTIVITIES (A. Battro, S. Dehaene & W. Singer eds., 
2013); Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351 (2012); Frank 
Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 MD. 
L. REV. 682 (2013); Frank Pasquale, Access to Medicine in an Era of Fractal Inequality, 19 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 269 (2010); Amanda C. Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain: A Critique of 
Neuroscience in Criminal Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183 (2009). 
82 See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY chs. 5 
& 6 (1992); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); WILFRID E. 
RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
(1968); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (2d ed. 1973); 
Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 
(1930); John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From 
the Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459 (1979). 
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legal process,83 critical legal studies,84 feminist legal theory,85 critical 
race theory,86 and LGBT theory.87  Many other projects, schools, pro-
 
83 See KALMAN, supra note 82, at 222-24; STEVENS, supra note 4, at 270-71.  For the bible 
of the legal process movement, see HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1958).  See also Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a 
Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 709-23 (1991) (discussing the “new” le-
gal process scholarship using the work of John Hart Ely as an example). 
84 See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); STEVENS, supra 
note 4, at 275; Symposium, Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Paul Brest, 
Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982); James Boyle, The Politics of Rea-
son: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985); Owen 
M. Fiss, The Law Regained, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1989); Robert W. Gordon, Critical 
Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); David M. Trubeck, Where the Action Is: Criti-
cal Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1984); Mark Tushnet, Critical Le-
gal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505 
(1986); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
561 (1983). 
85 See, e.g., FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN  LAW AND GENDER (Katharine T. Bart-
lett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991); ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN 
NATURE (1983); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
(1989); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989); DEBORAH L. 
RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW (1989); Isabel Marcus et 
al., Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law—A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11 
(1985); Symposium, Feminism in the Law: Theory, Practice and Criticism, 1989 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 1; Owen M. Fiss, What is Feminism?, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 413, 423-28 (1994). 
86 See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, JR., AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR 
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and 
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Stephen L. 
Carter, Academic Tenure and “White Male” Standards: Some Lessons from the Patent Law, 
100 YALE L.J. 2065 (1991); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: 
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 
(1988); Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal 
Education, 11 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1 (1989); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Le-
gal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39 (1991); Richard 
Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 
17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections 
on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984); Alan David Freeman, 
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of 
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of To-
kenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
1077 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 581 (1990); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991); 
Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989); 
Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolo-
nizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219; 
Colloquy, Responses to Randall Kennedy’s Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 1844 (1990). 
87 See, e.g., David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 997 
(2002); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002). 
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grams, and movements of varying sizes and scope no doubt could be 
included in this list.88 
“Law and . . .” programs are supplementary in nature, cross-
pollinating the legal subject matter with theories and methods from 
other mature disciplines.89  They expand theoretical perspectives and 
methodological tools to permit a more comprehensive examination of 
the nature and function of law, the effectiveness of legal institutions, 
and the legitimacy of legal results.  Critical jurisprudence, on the oth-
er hand, does not supplement legal study so much as seek to trans-
form it.  It argues, in one form or another, that conventional theory 
distorts and effaces the interests of marginalized groups, is internally 
contradictory, is based on false and ideologically motivated assump-
tions of social fact, is intellectually incoherent, and overstates its own 
 
88 They could include: legal formalism, see, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Elusive Trans-
formation, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 137, 154-57 (1994) (reviewing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 
(1992)); M.H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 95 (1986); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988); analytic 
jurisprudence, see, e.g., Edgar Bodenheimer, Modern Analytical Jurisprudence and the Lim-
its of Its Usefulness, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 1080 (1956); H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Sepa-
ration of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); rights jurisprudence, see, e.g., 
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
(1971); law and literature, see, e.g., Symposium, Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 
(1982); Symposium, Law and Literature: “No Manifesto,” 39 MERCER L. REV. 739 (1988); 
Robin L. West, Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations about the Law-as-
Literature Movement, 54 TENN. L. REV. 203 (1987); law and interpretation, see, e.g., Owen 
M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Michael S. Moore, The 
Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871 (1989); 
civic republicanism, see, e.g., Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 
1493 (1988); Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. 
REV. 801 (1993); legal pragmatism, see, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the 
Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988); John Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 332, 383-85 (1986); Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in Ameri-
can Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990); law and religion, see, e.g., MILNER S. 
BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW (1993); HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE 
RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1993); STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF 
DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); 
THOMAS L. SCHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT 
(1981); and law and globalization, see Carole Silver, Getting Real About Globalization and 
Legal Education: Potential and Perspectives for the U.S., 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 457 
(2013).  See also John O. Mudd, Academic Change in Law Schools, 29 GONZ. L. REV. 29, 30 
n.3 (1993-94) (summarizing the literature describing curricular change movements in Amer-
ican law schools). 
89 I think of a discipline as mature if it has a well-defined intellectual history, more than 
one major theoretical tradition, conflicting schools of thought within each tradition, shared 
analytical and empirical methods, and a core of basic knowledge that most in the discipline 
accept as true. 
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impartiality.90  In a sense, it challenges law to have the courage of its 
convictions.91 
While ostensibly different, therefore, one an outsider project 
interested in broadening law study and the other an insider project in-
terested in transforming it, “law and . . .” programs and critical juris-
prudential theories have important properties in common.  Both are 
normative projects, for example, concerned with issues of law, poli-
tics,92 and morality more than issues of skills, training, and technique, 
and focused on reforming rules, policies, and procedures more than 
refining practice conventions and consensus strategies.  Change legal 
rules, these projects seem to assume, and justice will be done; expand 
theoretical perspectives and understanding will increase.  Except for 
some forms of feminist jurisprudence, neither project is a “thousand 
points of light” or “eternal vigilance” type of reform in which collec-
tive change is seen as the sum of individual changes in the lives of 
discrete actors.  Each seems suspicious of reforms that require the 
coordination of thousands of individuals over time, in fact, where one 
cannot be sure everyone will do his part, or even that the parts will be 
understood consistently from one person to the next.  If the satisfac-
tion in legal thinking comes from knowing that future generations 
will march to the “measure of [one’s] thought,”93 it is not surprising 
 
90 The so-called nihilists state these claims in the strongest terms.  See, e.g., Clare Dalton, 
An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Gerald E. 
Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984); Mark 
G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance 
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Joseph Singer, The Player and 
the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984). 
91 Though this challenge often is expressed in the language of “fancy theory,” for the most 
part critical jurisprudence is not a theory-driven project.  Its proponents, trained mostly in 
law, argue the side of the analytical coin that says “not.”  They challenge popular beliefs us-
ing familiar legal ideas (e.g., justice, fairness, even-handedness, consistency, equality, and 
the like) and methods in a manner everyone in law school recognizes and accepts as legiti-
mate.  They do not need to be assimilated because they start in the mainstream, and this ex-
plains their relatively quick and easy acceptance, notwithstanding the often unwelcome na-
ture of what they have to say.  The Legal Realists and Critical Legal Studies “Crits” are the 
classic examples. 
92 I use “politics” here in its classical sense, as shorthand for the normative ideas and prin-
ciples (e.g., justice, fairness, equality) that a society uses to interpret and govern social life.  I 
do not mean organizational politics. 
93 See THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES: HIS SPEECHES, ESSAYS, LETTERS, AND 
JUDICIAL OPINIONS 32-33 (Max Lerner ed., Modern Library 1953) (1943) [hereinafter 
HOLMES]; 
Only when you have worked alone—when you have felt around you a 
black gulf of solitude more isolating than that which surrounds the dying 
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that the properties of law school curricular reform would be similarly 
grandiose. 
If past curricular reform efforts have been concerned princi-
pally with issues of law, politics, and morality, therefore, and have 
been based on ideas borrowed from other mature disciplines or criti-
cal jurisprudential schools of thought, skills instruction has a different 
focus and a different pedigree.  It is about lawyer behavior more than 
law (and individual lawyer behavior more than lawyer behavior in the 
aggregate), and strategic maneuvering more than politics and morali-
ty.94  For the most part, it accepts the moral and political beliefs of 
the existing legal world as givens and focuses on teaching students to 
achieve instrumental success within that world.  Its analytical catego-
ries are technical more than political, and its perspective is personal 
more than systemic.  It is a field without its own distinctive Freud-
Marx-Jesus debates (and more importantly, without its own Freud, 
Marx and Jesus), which is to say that it is a field that is not yet com-
pletely conceptualized, connected, and grounded.95 
The study of skills need not be relentlessly instrumental.  Ju-
risprudentially, it could be based on a kind of Holmesian “bad man” 
 
man, and in hope and in despair have trusted to your own unshaken 
will—then only will you have achieved.  Thus only can you gain the se-
cret isolated joy of the thinker, who knows that, a hundred years after he 
is dead and forgotten, men who never heard of him will be moving to the 
measure of his thought—the subtle rapture of a postponed power, which 
the world knows not because it has no external trappings, but which to 
his prophetic vision is more real than that which commands an army . . . 
it is only thus that you can know that you have done what it lay in you to 
do—can say that you have lived, and be ready for the end. 
Id. 
94 I do not suggest that practice skills are unrelated to politics and morality, just that the 
connections among the three are not self-evident and often are not made explicit in the litera-
ture on skills instruction. 
95 Accord Joseph P. Tomain & Michael E. Solimine, Skills Skepticism in the Postclinic 
World, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 307, 316 (1990) (“[U]ntil we connect skills programs to a sound, 
coherent, normatively grounded theory of lawyering—skills training will remain an empty 
technical exercise.”).  In a sense, skills instruction has the potential to re-work legal educa-
tion radically, substituting a functionalist approach to law for a conceptualist one.  In this, it 
shares the agenda of Legal Realism, at least Realism as envisioned in the 1920s and 30s, if 
not the one institutionalized in the 1950s.  See KALMAN, supra note 82, at 230-31.  But just 
as the potential of Realism was squelched by the Realists, see id., so too the potential of 
skills instruction is in danger of being squelched by skills teachers.  This happens all too of-
ten when curricular reform efforts become mainstream and produce what sociologists used to 
call the “institutionalization of means” and the “formalization of routine.”  See J.B. LON 
HEFFERLIN, DYNAMICS OF ACADEMIC REFORM 11 (1969). 
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(or Legal Realist “functionalist”) view, for example, one that looks at 
law and legal institutions from the perspective of how they will be 
manipulated by self-interested actors, and concerned with making 
suggestions, both to individuals and institutions, for neutralizing (or 
at least minimizing the harmful effects of) that manipulation.96  Early 
in its history, skills instruction looked as if it might develop in a ju-
risprudential direction, but for the most part that did not happen.97  In-
stead, many of its practitioners went down the path of technique 
(“best practices,” in the now-fashionable terminology),98 inventing 
and cataloguing socio-psychological moves and maneuvers (adapted 
from ego psychology, game theory, behavioral economics, and the 
like) for instrumental use in interactions with clients, adversaries, and 
others.  When this happened, issues of politics and morality were 
minimized, placed on hold, or dropped out of the picture altogether, 
and at that point skills instruction began to look like a foreign ele-
ment to many in the legal academy.99 
 
96 See HOLMES, supra note 93, at 74: 
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a 
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such 
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his rea-
sons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer 
sanctions of conscience. 
Id. 
97 For discussions in the early clinical literature of the relationship of skills to justice, see, 
e.g., William H. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. 
L. REV. 487 (1980); Marie Ashe, The “Bad Mother” in Law and Literature: A Problem of 
Representation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1017 (1992); Nancy Cook, Legal Fictions: Clinical Expe-
riences, Lace Collars and Boundless Stories, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 41 (1994); Theresa Glen-
non, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 
HASTINGS L.J. 1175 (1992); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Femi-
nism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599 (1991); Lucie E. White, Subordination, 
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1 (1990).  Much of this writing takes the form of richly annotated ethnographies of law 
practice, discussing skills in the context of what it means to succeed as a lawyer while treat-
ing others humanely, pursuing justice before material or reputational success, and living full 
emotional, social, and intellectual lives. 
98 See CARNEGIE, supra note 76; ROY STUCKEY AND OTHERS, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL 
EDUCATION (2007). 
99 For the most part, the early clinical law professors were former legal services lawyers 
whose political and moral views shaped their teaching in very explicit ways.  See Anthony 
G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education—A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
612 (1984); Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 
NLADA BRIEFCASE 106 (1977); Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Negotiating Tactics 
for Legal Services Lawyers, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 259 (1973).  They taught about poverty 
and its effects, institutional ineptitude and unresponsiveness, distributional inequities, preju-
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The most prominent of the skills instruction reforms, the clin-
ical education movement of the 1960s and 1970s, was based on a 
substantive critique of legal education that succeeded in major part 
because it was made at a time (not unlike the present) when the legal 
world was in turmoil and law schools were undergoing a crisis of 
confidence.100  Law faculties varyingly were convinced, intimidated, 
or shamed into increasing their skills offerings but not to the point 
where such instruction became the central focus of law study.  Some 
still regret the decision to do this and they comprise a large segment 
of those opposed to the “practice ready” reform.101  Others, particu-
larly those who participated in clinical courses in law school, are 
willing to give skills instruction more time to develop, but they too 
often are reluctant to make it the focal point of law study.  Proponents 
 
dice and its consequences, and the possibilities and limits of an ends-based morality author-
izing system manipulation to produce good outcomes in individual cases.  See Gary S. Laser, 
Educating for Professional Competence in the Twenty-First Century: Educational Reform at 
Chicago-Kent College of Law, 68 CHI-KENT L. REV. 243, 275 (1992) (“Most of the early 
programs in clinical education dealt with problems of poverty and thus involved the law 
school in performing services for the poor as well as addressing the issue of how problems of 
the poor could best be solved.”); Nina W. Tarr, Current Issues in Clinical Legal Education, 
37 HOW. L.J. 31, 33 (1993) (“In some clinics there is a political agenda grounded in liberal-
ism that remains committed to using the legal system as a vehicle for change.”).  Many (but 
not all) of those who followed in the wake of these early clinicians dropped this legal ser-
vices agenda, however, in an effort to broaden the appeal of clinical courses to law students 
generally, and they did not always replace it with a jurisprudential equivalent.  See Tomain 
& Solimine, supra note 95, at 314-15; Tarr, supra, at 35-36 (“Some clinics want[ed] to de-
emphasize the political agenda of their programs to make them more palatable to various 
constituents, such as law school faculties and administrations, conservative students, local 
bars, funding sources, and alumni.  By focusing on ‘skills’ instead of on poverty law and jus-
tice, the programs seem less objectionable.”); Peter Toll Hoffman, Clinical Scholarship and 
Skills Training, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 93, 105 (1994) (“[N]o doctrine or theory underlies many 
lawyering skills, but instead only a collection of anecdotal suggestions about how to accom-
plish particular tasks . . . . [U]ntil [the skills] subject matter can be presented in the guise of a 
theory, it will receive little respect or recognition from law teachers . . . .”).  The legal ser-
vices perspective remains alive and well in some clinical programs, see 2013 Conference on 
Clinical Education in San Juan, Puerto Rico, 2013 AALS NEWS (Aug. 2013), at 22-24 (de-
scribing clinical programs focused on social justice issues); Anna E. Carpenter, The Project 
Model of Clinical Education: Eight Principles to Maximize Student Learning and Social Jus-
tice Impact, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 39 (2013) (describing a model of clinical education that 
“holds great potential for creating systematic change,” but it is no longer the dominant model 
everywhere, having lost out to the “Best Practices” movement in many places). 
100 See Condlin, supra note 4, at 332-36 (describing the political forces that coalesced to 
pressure law schools to adopt skills training programs). 
101 See Lande, supra note 4, at 7 (describing “skepticism by some faculty about the value 
of skills courses and a belief that students should learn practical skills after graduation” as 
one of the obstacles to making legal education more practical). 
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of skills instruction have yet to convince the professoriate that the 
study of practice skill is a natural extension of the intellectual and 
substantive activity going on in the rest of law school, the application 
of “thinking like a lawyer” skills to the practical realm.  That this 
would remain a live concern more than fifty years after the clinical 
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s reflects the difficulty of the is-
sues.102 
V. CONCLUSION 
The debate over the place of “practice ready” skills instruc-
tion in American legal education is a little like the Thirty Years 
War.103  The causes of the War went back decades to unresolved 
grievances, unfulfilled promises, unfair treaties, unmade marriages 
and unrealized images of one’s place in the world, so that while os-
tensibly about religion, the War also was about the division of 
wealth, territory, status, and power.  It flared up and died down on a 
regular basis for at least thirty, and as many as one hundred, years 
depending upon where one lived, and more than once when it ap-
peared to be over a new country was heard from (usually at the prod-
ding of some evil genius), in the form of an invasion or an alliance, 
and the fighting started all over again.  Like two-party resolutions to 
multi-party bargaining problems, peace treaties routinely were desta-
 
102 Practitioners do not always understand that the issues are difficult.  See Dilloff, supra 
note 14, at 428 (wondering why fifteen years after the MACCRATE REPORT, and five years 
after the CARNEGIE REPORT, “there has been [so] little comprehensive reform in how lawyers 
are trained”); Lande, supra note 4, at 4-5 (describing the Bar’s repeated attempts to make 
major changes in legal education and the limited success it has had in those efforts).  For a 
description of the widespread contradictions, confusions, and incoherencies in the 
MACCRATE REPORT, and an explanation of why it should not have been implemented, see 
Robert J. Condlin, MacScholarship: Another Perspective on the MacCrate Report, Lawyer-
ing Skills, and Legal Education (Sept. 12, 1994) (on file with author). 
103 At first, the War looked like just another religious conflict, common in central Europe 
at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when the forces of Lutheran Protestantism chal-
lenged the armies of the Catholic Counter-Reformation at every available opportunity.  But 
the fighting that began with an airborne assault on the Catholic Lords Regent of Matthias of 
Austria, King of Bohemia, by a group of Protestant delegates to the Prague assembly was no 
ordinary war.  Lasting nearly a century, it drew all of Europe into its vortex, and by the time 
it was over it had helped undermine the authority of the Hapsburg dynasty, accelerated the 
demise of the Holy Roman Empire, and brought about a permanent transformation in Euro-
pean statecraft.  See HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 56-75 (1994); GEOFFREY PARKER, THE 
THIRTY YEARS’ WAR passim (1984); THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR passim (Theodore K. Rabb 
ed., 1972) [hereinafter RABB]. 
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bilized by those treated badly by the settlement terms, those who 
would benefit from the devastation more fighting would bring, and 
those who simply liked to fight.  Only an epoch-making shift in geo-
political thinking, from the universalist morality of medieval Christi-
anity’s “one god in heaven and one ruler on earth,” to the modern Re-
alpolitik based view of raison d’état and balance of power, freed the 
belligerents to design and implement a lasting peace.104 
The law school skills instruction debate also goes back dec-
ades to unresolved disagreements, unrequited overtures, and unfor-
given slights, sometimes reducing to a trickle, only to become resur-
gent at the urging of a powerful interest group or strong personality; 
and it too seems destined never to end.105  While ostensibly about the 
content and structure of American legal education, it also is about the 
allocation of power, status, and authority in the legal profession, the 
important practical question of who will pay for what, and the seem-
ingly intractable problem of how to connect theory to practice.106  
Whether the debate will end like the War, with a reconciliatory intel-
lectual breakthrough, remains to be seen, though there are reasons to 
be doubtful, and the argument for practice ready graduates shows 
why.  Where the discussion of morality and politics is called for, it 
focuses on motor skills and costs.  Where theory is needed, it offers 
 
104 The entire experience, in the words of one commentator, was “an object lesson on the 
dangers and disasters which can arise when men of narrow hearts and little minds are in high 
places.”  C.V. Wedgewood, The Futile and Meaningless War, in RABB, supra note 103, at 
32. 
105 While it may have no obvious analogue to the Second Defenestration of Prague, the 
debate is replete with arguments about not “throwing out the baby with the bath water.”  See, 
e.g., Frank, supra note 4, at 914-18 (throwing out traditional instruction); Carl McGowan, 
The University Law School and Practical Education, 65 A.B.A. J. 374 (1979) (throwing out 
skills instruction).  See also KALMAN, supra note 82, at 175 (“Frank wanted to throw the ba-
by out with the bath water.”). 
106 Steve Ellmann describes the problem well.  “[I] think that [one of] the reasons for prac-
tice education’s incomplete acceptance . . . is that there really is a longstanding, deep anxiety 
among law professors (non-clinicians and clinicians alike) about whether theory and practice 
are meaningfully connected.  If what ‘academics’ do is theorize, then a law school needs to 
be a theoretically focused place; if what professional schools teach is practice, then a law 
school needs to be a practice-focused place.  There are big anxieties, I suspect, on both sides 
of that sentence.  I’d resolve the tension by persuading all concerned that the theory and 
practice are integrally connected, but as long as that’s not a deeply held conviction it will 
remain true that law teachers primarily concerned with practice will be different from law 
teachers primarily concerned with theory.”  Email from Steve Ellmann, Professor of Law 
and Director of Clinical and Experimental Learning, New York Law School, to author (Aug. 
25, 2013) (on file with author). 
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taxonomy.  Where depth is required, it glides cheerfully over the sur-
face.  And where multiple points of view are needed, it narrows dis-
cussion to a single idea.107  It has all the qualities of a lost cause hav-
ing a Warholian moment.  Hopefully, the good sense that prevailed in 
the last century has some life left in it yet. 
 
 
107 See Diamond, Never Mind, supra note 26 (describing a combatant in the debate char-
acterizing opposing views as “faulty,” “misleading,” “not true,” having only “the external 
trappings of precision and rigor,” “puffed up exaggeration,” “brazen bluff,” “sloppy,” “slant-
ed,” “ad hoc,” “compromised,” “chest-pounding,” “full of holes,” “dubious,” “flawed,” 
“fudged,” “distorted,” and “substantially overstated,” just before admitting that he was 
wrong about all of that). 
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